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ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes a framework for analyzing an individual’s path to violent extremism. 
The CITIG framework  (crisis, identity, ties, indoctrination, and grievances) offers a four-
stage process of radicalization that begins with a personal crisis (Stage One), the 
construction of a new identity (Stage Two), activism (Stage Three), and the preparation 
and execution of a criminal or violent attack (Stage Four). This thesis begins by offering 
working definitions of key terms, and then uses the proposed CITIG framework along 
with the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment instrument to analyze four U.S.-based case 
studies: two examples of Islamic-inspired violent extremism, one case of white-
supremacist violence, and one of eco-extremism. These cases further refine the proposed 
framework and reveal a three-pillar approach for countering extremism: prevention, 
intervention and interdiction. 
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 1 
I. FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
In the years following the attacks on September 11, the United States and its 
partners around the world have intensified their efforts to research, develop, and 
implement a variety of methods and models to prevent and counter violent extremism 
(CVE). Despite these efforts, there is evidence to suggest that violent extremism 
continues to spread within the United States, as evidenced by numerous thwarted attacks 
within the homeland, as well as a number of U.S. citizens traveling abroad to commit 
violent acts. The issue of concern is not just how to counter violent acts, but how to better 
understand the radicalization process in order to develop effective strategies to prevent 
radicalization from occurring. 
Faced with a growing threat of violent extremism within the United States, the 
Obama administration initially addressed the issue of CVE in its 2010 National Security 
Strategy. This document claimed that the “best defense against this threat are well 
informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions.”1 This strategy 
relies upon improving the resilience of at-risk communities through increased public-
private partnerships, engagement with communities and citizens, and preventing attacks 
on the homeland through robust intelligence and law enforcement security capabilities.2 
Alongside the 2010 National Security Strategy, the White House published the 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, in which 
they attempted to frame the problem of violent extremism and identify the best methods 
for CVE. Building upon the conceptualized CVE framework in the 2010 National 
Security Strategy, the administration began to articulate a community based approach 
with the goal “to prevent violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, 
                                                 
1 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy of the United States (2010) (Washington, DC: Diane 
Publishing, 2010), 19.  
2 Ibid. 
 2 
radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit 
acts of violence.”3 
That same year, in order to transform their guidance into an executable concept, 
the White House published their Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (SIP). The SIP went further in 
articulating the implementation of four shared objectives that are nested within these 
areas of action: “whole-of-government coordinating; leveraging existing public safety, 
violence prevention, and community resilience programming; coordination of domestic 
and international CVE efforts; and addressing technology and virtual space.”4 The SIP 
tasked these objectives to be executed by all government agencies based on their specific 
capacities. 
In an effort to fulfill these tasks, local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) have 
begun to apply the strategy of Community Oriented Policing (COP). Examples of this are 
found in the three pilot CVE cities of Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Boston that utilize 
COP to engage local communities. The goal of these initiatives is to overcome cultural 
barriers, develop rapport, and address community grievances in an attempt to prevent the 
spread of extremism and recruitment. These efforts have resulted in greater community 
awareness and interaction with local LEAs, which together have had the effect of 
increased reporting of potential extremism within the community. 
Despite these initial reports and efforts designed to raise awareness of CVE 
vulnerabilities, Jerome P. Bjelopera, a specialist in organized crime and terrorism, 
prepared a report for the Congressional Research Service in February of 2014 titled 
Countering Violent Extremism in the United States. In the report, Bjelopera identifies 
numerous shortcomings with the CVE SIP,5 which can be consolidated into three main 
ideas. The first is a lack of clearly defined terms involving extremism in order to establish 
                                                 
3 White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
(Washington, DC: Diane Publishing, 2011), 3. 
4 White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States (Washington, DC: Diane Publishing, 2011), 4. 
5 Jerome P. Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States (CRS Report No. R42553) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 24–28. 
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a common language. Second is the lack of an effective framework that explains the 
complex process of radicalization to provide a common understanding among those 
involved in CVE. Third is the lack of identified catalytic and protective attributes 
associated with the radicalization process, from which effective prevention and 
intervention strategies can be developed by community based agencies and organizations. 
This report, in other words, points to some major short-comings of the current approach 
to countering violent extremism. 
This thesis aims to address these three identified deficiencies of the CVE SIP. It 
will begin by offering working definitions of the terms associated with CVE, including 
radicalization, extremism, violent extremist, and criminal extremist. Furthermore, this 
thesis proposes a distinction between violent extremists and criminal extremists; the 
former aims to harm people, the latter engages in harm to property, but deliberately 
avoids harming people. Second, in addition to definitions, it will propose a four stage 
process of radicalization that includes a personal crisis in Stage One, contact with 
extremists, indoctrination and the framing of grievances in Stage Two, activism in Stage 
Three, and either a criminal or violent act in Stage Four. And third, the thesis will attempt 
to identify key catalytic and protective attributes associated with the radicalization 
process with the aim of using these key variables to create effective intervention 
strategies.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
These efforts are part of the general research question of this thesis, which is: 
How can U.S. efforts in CVE be improved to prevent, intervene, and interdict violent 
extremism? Within this broad question, the thesis will also ask more specific questions, 
including what is extremism? What is the process of radicalization? And how can 
community mobilization address extremism? 
B. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis constructs a framework of radicalization that focuses specifically on 
the individual’s path to extremism. This framework proposes that the process begins with 
a crisis that leads to the formation of an extremist identity, contact with extremists, 
 4 
indoctrination into an ideology, and identification of grievances through framing. 
Consistent with this outline, we name the new radicalization framework the CITIG 
(crisis, identity, ties, indoctrination, and grievances) framework. 
The framework consists of four stages. Stage One begins with a personal crisis 
that is exacerbated by antecedent conditions, such as a lack of strong social ties that 
typically provide an individual with support networks and grounding within their existing 
identity and social structure. The result is the search for a resolution to the crisis, which 
can lead to the formation of an extremist identity. 
Stage Two begins with a search to resolve the crisis, which leads an individual to 
make new ties or find an ideology, either of which results in the formation of a new 
identity that will continue to evolve throughout the radicalization process. Stage Two also 
consists of the reframing of the personal crisis and the linking of the evolving identity to 
a grievance through indoctrination that may proceed, or follow, contact with extremists. 
In an effort to gain acceptance and approval (identity verification) in the new identity, 
individuals will begin activism. 
In Stage Three, the individual begins activism on behalf of the perceived 
grievances associated with the new extremist identity. Activism serves three functions: 
cementing the extremist identity; providing a sense of meaning and belonging for the 
individual in the extremist community; and providing a mechanism to address grievances. 
The CITIG framework further proposes that, through repeated identity verification and 
the development of extremist ties, the extremist identity will rise to the master identity 
position late in Stage Three, or at the beginning of Stage Four. 
Progression to Stage Four occurs when there is a perceived lack of a resolution 
mechanism for the grievance, or crisis, and the individual believes that criminal or violent 
action will be beneficial. The extremist begins operational planning to execute a specific 
action, criminal or violent, which they believe will force a resolution to their grievance. 
The thesis then uses the CITIG framework, along with the violent extremism risk 
assessment instrument (VERA), to methodically analyze cases in order to test its validity 
in the radicalization process. VERA is the first risk assessment instrument developed 
 5 
specifically for violent extremists, and includes a wide array of variables that are 
organized in five categories: attitudes/mental processes, contextual factors, historical 
factors, protective factors, and demographic factors. The thesis then uses the model to 
investigate four case studies of individuals who have become radicalized and engaged in 
acts of violent or criminal extremism in the United States: two of the cases involve 
Islamic-inspired extremism, one involves white supremacy, and the last eco-extremism. 
The individuals for the case studies were selected from the FBI’s list of convicted 
terrorists. From the FBI’s list, cases were selected based upon ideological categories 
(Islamic-inspired, white supremacist, and eco-extremist) and the availability of 
documented information. Information for each case study is drawn from court documents 
and other publically available information. The case studies also include social and 
contextual factors to better understand the conditions that fuel extremism. By comparing 
different ideological forms of extremism, the goal is to find common and unique causes 
of extremism within each of these movements. 
The first case study is Faisal Shahzad, a violent extremist who attempted to 
detonate a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Times Square on May 
1, 2010. The second case study investigates Mohamud Osman Mohamud, a violent 
extremist who attempted to detonate a VBIED at the Christmas tree lighting ceremony in 
Portland, Oregon on November 26, 2010. The third case study considers a white 
supremacist, Kevin Harpham, who planted an explosive device at the Martin Luther King 
Jr. Unity Day Parade in Spokane, Washington on January 17, 2011. The final case 
considers the radicalization of eco-extremist Briana Waters, who took part in two 
separate arson attacks aimed at stopping perceived destruction of the environment in 
Seattle, Washington, on May 21, 2001, and Susanville, California, on October 15, 2001. 
Information for each case study is drawn from court documents and other 
publically available information. In addition to focusing on their personal lives, the case 
studies will also include each extremist’s social and contextual factors to better 
understand the conditions that fuel extremism. By comparing different ideological forms 
of extremism, the goal is to find common and unique causes of extremism within each of 
these movements. 
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C. FINDINGS  
Applying the CITIG framework to a diverse set of case studies reveals a number 
of similarities across ideological lines that indicate the possibility for a universal 
longitudinal radicalization process. Additionally, using VERA, the thesis identifies 
important attributes in each stage. However, given that VERA was developed specifically 
for assessing violent extremists, we recommend a separate risk assessment instrument be 
developed for criminal extremists. 
The risk factors identified in the case studies also provide insight into developing 
effective programs to counter extremism. Specifically, we find support for the Los 
Angeles Interagency Coordination Group’s (LA ICG) three pillar framework of 
prevention, intervention, and interdiction. However, due to the low number of reliable 
risk factors at the individual level, prevention programs should address local factors at the 
community level. While every community is different, prevention should focus on the 
following factors: grievances, the extremist ideologies, the acceptance of violence, 
awareness of the problem in the community, and the development of both prosocial and 
cross-cutting ties to build socially cohesive communities that provide support to those 
who experience crises. 
Intervention, by its nature, needs to focus on individuals who have demonstrated 
risk factors. Risk factors for intervention in Stage Two are extremist indoctrination, 
contact with extremists, attachment to an extremist ideology, and perceptions of injustice. 
In Stage Three, activism, they are dehumanization of an identified target, glorification of 
criminal or violent action, and, in some cases, travel abroad for training or fighting. 
Intervention may still occur in Stage Four, where individuals are preparing for a specific 
attack. Due to the relatively consistent attributes associated with stages two and three, 
intervention efforts can be applied to a broad range of factors that mutually support each 
other. Ultimately, intervention efforts should sever extremist ties and build prosocial ties, 
address the personal crisis that began the process, counter the extremist ideology, identify 
positive outlets for social change, and develop the belief that crime and violence do not 
solve problems. 
 7 
The interdiction pillar is primarily a law enforcement function, but the 
relationship between communities and law enforcement remains critical in this stage. 
Law enforcement should separate intelligence collection efforts from community 
engagement associated with prevention and intervention efforts in order to maintain trust 
with communities. Also, law enforcement should work with community leaders to divert 
individuals into intervention programs rather than confinement with no specialized de-
radicalization programs. 
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this thesis is broken into five chapters. Chapter II provides 
working definitions to address the wide range of extremism and reviews the relevant 
literature on defining extremism. Chapter III reviews several leading models of 
radicalization and proposes a new framework, the CITIG framework, for the 
radicalization process. Chapter III also introduces VERA as the basis for identifying 
specific attributes during the radicalization process. Chapter IV analyzes two Islamic-
inspired case studies using the CITIG framework and VERA. Chapter V analyzes two 
case studies, one white supremacist and one eco-extremist, using the CITIG framework 
and VERA. Chapter VI reviews the findings from the case studies and presents the 
refined framework. Chapter VI also reviews existing programs that counter violent 
extremism and recommends support for Los Angeles interagency coordination group’s 
(LA ICG) three pillar framework to counter violent extremism. 
 8 
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II. DEFINITIONS OF EXTREMISM 
A. WHAT IS EXTREMISM? 
Among academics, policy makers and various government agencies, opinions 
differ as to what extremism is and is not, which leads to disagreement on how to properly 
define this phenomenon. Compounding this problem is the large spectrum of ideas and 
behaviors that are classified as extremist. This lack of clarity creates problems when 
attempting to frame extremism, understand the conditions under which it occurs, and 
develop effective methods to counter extremism.  
In this chapter, we will attempt to provide a working definition of extremism 
based on academic research. This chapter will begin by providing foundational 
definitions of key terms involved with extremism, including radicalization and sub-
categories of extremism. We will then divide extremism into two components: an 
ideational spectrum that ranges from normal to extreme beliefs and a behavioral spectrum 
from latent to violent behaviors. This conceptual approach provides an understanding of 
the difference between normal and extremist ideas and the range of behaviors observed in 
extremist groups.  
B. DEFINING EXTREMISM 
In 1999, the Future Developments in Terrorism Conference held at University 
College Cork, Ireland, brought together law enforcement experts, policy makers and 
academics with experience and focus in the field of terrorism research. Throughout the 
conference, the groups of experts attempted to frame and define the term terrorism 
without great success. Of particular importance, the lines between terrorism, organized 
crime, and political violence were blurred, along with efforts to define state and non-state 
acts that have historically been coded as terrorism. These different uses of the term only 
confounded efforts to create a clear definition of terrorism.6  
                                                 
6 Maxwell Taylor and John Horgan, The Future of Terrorism (New York: Psychology Press, 2000), 5. 
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Sociologist Pamala Griset and criminal justice expert Sue Mahan argue that “the 
distinction is often blurry between terrorism, guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare, and 
criminal activity.”7 Despite the ambiguity of the term terrorism, psychologists Taylor and 
Horgan note that “whether it is appropriate or otherwise, the term ‘terrorism’ has wide 
currency and popular usage, and it is unlikely to disappear from our vocabularies.”8 
A similar phenomenon occurs in attempting to create a definition of the term 
extremism. In the past decade a multitude of similar terms have been used 
interchangeably by academics, government officials, and law enforcement agencies 
(LEAs) to define and describe this broad concept. Terms like terrorist, jihadi, radical, and 
lone wolf are used alongside and interchangeably with the phrase violent extremist.9 
Furthermore, U.S. government branches and agencies that do have a working definition 
of extremism each have their own description, which confuses both the problem and the 
desired goals for countering the problem.10  
Properly defined terms are necessary to avoid confusion and allow for researchers 
to study a category that is relevant to policy makers and law enforcement. One example 
of the confusion caused by lack of clarity in defining extremism is Nidal Hassan’s attack 
on Fort Hood in 2009. The Department of Defense classified the attack as workplace 
violence, instead of violent extremism or terrorism, despite the assailant’s clear 
connection to the Al Qaeda leader Anwar Al-Awlaki and Hassan’s stated ideological 
motivation.11 While this is only one example, the problem of labeling becomes important 
for categorizing and understanding the motives behind these acts.  
In an effort to unite policy makers, law enforcement personnel, and academics, 
the White House published its strategy Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
                                                 
7 Pamala L. Griset and Sue Mahan, Terrorism in Perspective (London: Sage Publications, 2003), xiii. 
8 Taylor and Horgan, The Future of Terrorism, 5. 
9 Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley, “The Psychology of Lone-Wolf Terrorism,” Counselling 
Psychology Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2011): 115–126; Alex P. Schmid, “Comments on Marc Sageman’s 
Polemic “the Stagnation in Terrorism Research,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 587–
95; Andrew Silke, “Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization,” 
European Journal of Criminology 5, no. 1 (2008): 99–123. 
10 John Hayward, “Defining Terrorism,” RedState, April 16, 2013.  
11 Ibid. 
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Extremism in the United States in 2011.12 Its strategy defines violent extremists as 
“individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political 
goals.”13 Two issues arise from the White House’s definition of violent extremism. First, 
the definition narrowly restricts the motivation of violent acts to further political goals. 
Although political motivations are commonly rooted in beliefs and ideology, political 
goals are not the only reason that an individual may commit a violent act and therefore 
political goals are not relevant to the definition. The second issue is that the definition is 
too inclusive; rather than strictly referring to those who commit violence, it also 
encompasses those who merely support violence. The importance of this delineation will 
be discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
Modifying the White House’s 2011 definition of a violent extremist, this thesis 
argues that a violent extremist is an individual who commits ideologically motivated 
violence with the intent to inflict human harm or death in support of his or her extremist 
beliefs and values.14 
C. EXTREMIST BELIEFS VS. ACTIONS 
Psychologists McCauley and Moskalenko argue that in addition to the violent 
extremist, there are three additional categories of actors: inert, activist, and radical.15 
These terms, as discussed above, have been used in different ways in the literature, 
creating confusion over what specifically constitutes one or the other and how the terms 
relate to each other. The specificity of and the relationship between the terms is necessary 
to understand the concept of extremism and to develop strategies to prevent future 
extremist acts. 
In an effort to establish specific terms and the relationship between them, it is 
useful to divide the phenomenon of extremism into behavioral and ideational aspects.  
                                                 
12 White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 1. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Some Things We Think We’ve Learned since 9/11: A 
Commentary on Marc Sageman’s “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,”“ Terrorism and Political 
Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 602. 
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Figure 1 envisions two separate continuums, one ideational and one behavioral. 
The unique characteristic of such a concept is that it accounts for the separate yet 
intersecting ranges of normal to extremist beliefs, and latent to violent behaviors. On the 
ideational continuum, normal is identified as beliefs and values that are socially accepted. 
As one moves to the right on the continuum, beliefs and values become less socially 
acceptable and therefore extreme. For example, throughout American society, activism is 
present in the form of peaceful protests in support of or against beliefs and values, such 
as equality or human rights. However, activism in support of beliefs and values outside of 
what society identifies as acceptable, such as activism in support of the racist ideals of the 
Ku Klux Klan, is also present, though in smaller numbers.  
 
Figure 1.  Disaggregating Ideas and Behavior 
Several tools exist for better understanding the ideas and beliefs of a population. 
Polling data is one key source of information for understanding the range of values and 
norms on a particular idea or issue within a given population. Focus groups also allow 
researchers to understand the qualitative elements of local thoughts and views. 
Combining qualitative and quantitative methods provides both a deeper understanding of 
local thoughts and beliefs and the geographic and demographic boundaries of the 
problem in order to focus efforts. Community leaders can also provide a wealth of 
knowledge on both the local context of extremist beliefs and some of the factors that are 
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catalyzing or inhibiting these beliefs. A range of extremist beliefs may be present in one 
community, and it is important to understand the nuance of the local area before 
attempting to change extreme views and beliefs.  
The second spectrum depicts behavior. Similar to McCauley and Moskalenko’s 
argument for multiple categories, Horgan argues that the violent actions of extremists are 
only “the tip of an iceberg of activity.”16  
There is very often migration both between and within roles, from illegal 
(e.g., engaging in violent activity) to gray areas (supporting the 
engagement in violent activity) to legal (e.g., peaceful protest, visiting 
relevant Websites to learn). While many of the activities that members of 
terrorist [extremist] movements engage in are not actually illegal per se 
(and cannot be meaningfully encompassed under the label terrorism, but 
instead subversion), without these activities, actual terrorist [violent 
extremist] operations could not develop, evolve, or be sustained over time 
and place. Engagement in violent activity is what we most commonly 
associate with terrorism [violent extremism].17 
Expanding on Horgan’s argument of a range of behaviors, four separate 
categories are proposed here: latent, activism, criminal, and violent. These terms 
demonstrate variation in both legal and illegal activities. The latent and activism 
behaviors encompass variation within the legal spectrum, and criminal and violent 
represent variations within the illegal spectrum. 
The behavioral spectrum provides a framework from which to define the four 
identified behaviors. Latent behavior is characterized by inaction, due to the inability or 
unwillingness to take action. The inverse of latent behavior is activism. It is characterized 
by activities that encompass legal acts, such as protests, letter writing, chat room 
discussions, and donations of time, money, or goods. Activism can also cross into the 
illegal spectrum with acts of civil disobedience. Further along the illegal spectrum are 
criminal acts, such as arson, robbery, and abduction. Violent behaviors at the far end of 
the spectrum are criminal in nature; however, they specifically intend to harm or kill.  
                                                 
16 John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on 
Radicalization into Terrorism,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
618, no. 1 (2008): 80–94. 
17 Ibid. 
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When ideas and behaviors are examined from the perspective of separate but 
intersecting continuums, it becomes clear that the majority of criminal and violent acts 
are not those motivated by extremist beliefs, but by normal beliefs. Equally important, 
many individuals who hold extreme views never conduct a criminal or violent act. This 
suggests that, while violent extremists are relatively rare, the entire extremist population 
is much larger; therefore countering extremism should address all of the separate 
extremist categories.  
Psychologists McCauley and Moskalenko, for example, suggest that the violent 
extremist category accounts for about 1% of all extremists.18 In their discussion about 
why there is such a sharp disparity between beliefs and actions, they make several claims. 
They argue “[t]here is no ‘conveyer belt’ from extreme beliefs to extreme actions,” that 
“fighting extreme ideas is a different problem than fighting terrorists,” and different 
agencies would be better suited to combating ideas and actions.19 Broadly, these 
observations imply that there is not a direct relationship between ideas and behaviors, but 
they are related in some way. Chapter III will discuss the relation of extreme ideas and 
action further, offering specific intervening variables to explain some of the disparity. 
Figure 2 illustrates the concept of the behavioral spectrum for both normal and 
extreme ideational spectrums. The image separates the population of the United States 
into the two separate groups using a hypothetical rate of 15% extremism, indicating that 
the United States has 75,387,451 individuals that hold extreme views. This number 
includes extremist views of all types (jihadi, eco-extremist, white supremacist, etc.).  
                                                 
18 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Some Things We Think We’ve Learned since 9/11: A 
Commentary on Marc Sageman’s ‘the Stagnation in Terrorism Research,’” Terrorism and Political 




Figure 2.  Frequency of Violent Extremism 
Data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uniform crime reports (UCR) 
indicate that there were 367.9 violent acts per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013.20 This 
provides a total number of violent acts that can then be further divided into those 
committed by the “normal” and by extremist individuals. Using the FBI UCR rate and the 
total extremist population, the United States experienced 178,857 violent extremist acts 
in 2013. The global terrorism database indicates there were 15 terrorist (violent 
extremist) incidents in the United States during 2013.21 These two numbers are 
significantly different, indicating that either (1) incidents that were acts of violent 
extremism were miscategorized as normal violent acts, such as Nidal Hassan, or (2) the 
rate of extremist violent acts is incorrect. Both of these are likely to have contributed to 
the disparity in the reported numbers and the hypothetical numbers using the FBI rate.  
                                                 
20 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniformed Crime Report: Crime in the United States 2013 Violent 
Crime (Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, 2013). 
21 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global 
Terrorism Database [Terrorist Attacks in the United States] (College Park, MD: National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2013).  
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D. BEYOND VIOLENCE  
Violence is often associated with the definition of extremism,22 but the criminal 
acts performed in support of extremist beliefs and ideas are also important. Examining 
the activities of eco-terrorists, for example, illustrate that they often commit acts directed 
against property, such as arson, in order to inflict economic damage on their adversaries. 
Most eco-terrorists actively avoid harming human beings, which might exclude them 
from some definitions of violent extremism.  
Investigative psychologists Canter and Youngs identify acts against person and 
property as two separate and distinct categories of crime using multi-dimensional scaling, 
and specifically, smallest space analysis, which is a non-metric mathematical technique 
that analyzes and compares the co-occurrence of attributes in relation to each other rather 
than as an absolute value.23 This approach allows for patterns in the data to emerge and to 
create useful categorical distinctions to analyze acts. Given the empirical support of the 
person-property distinction in criminal literature, this thesis will use the term criminal 
extremist for those who commit acts against property, and violent extremist for those who 
use violence against people.  
E. RADICALIZATION: THE PROCESS OF BECOMING MORE EXTREME  
In an effort to understand how an individual or group arrives at the point at which 
they are willing to commit crimes or violent acts in support of their beliefs, some have 
developed theory and some have applied existing theories to the problem. While Chapter 
III will provide a much more detailed explanation on the leading theories, a brief 
explanation of each category will be provided here. 
In an effort to explain radicalization, some researchers have built unique theories. 
In the process a debate has emerged on whether radicalization is a process with definitive 
stages or a series of mechanisms that are unstructured. Among the process oriented 
                                                 
22 Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on 
Radicalization into Terrorism,” 86; Moskalenko and McCauley, “The Psychology of Lone-Wolf 
Terrorism,” 115. 
23 David Canter and Donna Youngs, Investigative Psychology: Offender Profiling and the Analysis of 
Criminal Action (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 101. 
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research are models, such as the New York Police Department (NYPD) model of 
radicalization,24 the National Counter-Terrorism Center model,25 and Moghaddam’s 
staircase model.26 Silber and Bhatt’s NYPD model argues that radicalization occurs in 
four stages: (1) pre-radicalization, (2) self-identification, (3) indoctrination, and (4) 
jihadization.27 The National Counter-Terrorism Center’s model consists of three phases: 
(1) radicalization, (2) mobilization, and (3) action.28 Mogahaddam’s staircase model 
posits that the journey is analogous to climbing a narrowing staircase that has five floors: 
(1) relative deprivation, (2) perceived injustice and individual mobility, (3) displacement 
of aggression, (4) engagement with a morality supportive of terrorism, (4) perceived 
legitimacy and solidification of categorical thinking, (5) vilification and distancing of the 
enemy particularly through myth.29 These three explanations and their varying numbers 
of stages indicate that there is little agreement on the actual process of radicalization.  
Opposing the process-centric models, McCauley and Moskalenko argue that 
radicalization happens through a variety of mechanisms that are interrelated but have no 
organizing structure.30 They propose 12 mechanisms (Figure 3) that justify violence from 
the individual through the mass level.31  
                                                 
24 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York: 
New York Police Department, 2007): 1–92. 
25 Karen D. Keys-Turner, “The Violent Islamic Radicalization Process: A Framework for 
Understanding” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011). 
26 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “Psychological Processes and ‘the Staircase to Terrorism,’” American 
Psychologist 60, no. 9 (2005): 1039–1041. 
27 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. 
28 Keys-Turner, “The Violent Islamic Radicalization Process: A Framework for Understanding.” 
29 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American 
Psychologist 60, no. 2 (2005): 161–169. 
30 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways 




Figure 3.  Pathways to Violence: Mechanisms of Political Radicalization at 
Individual, Group, and Mass-public Levels32 
In addition to these explicit attempts to build theory, several researchers have 
used existing theories to explain radicalization. One such example is the use of Social 
Identity Theory, which is described as a process of self-categorization that forms identity 
in groups.33 Security studies researcher Dina Al Raffie uses Social Identity Theory to 
argue that the more pervasive an identity is within an environment, the more conducive 
the environment is to extremism.34 Specifically, her work focuses on the presence of 
Islamist ideology in the diaspora and the interaction between normal and extreme ideas, 
arguing the more pervasive the Islamist view is in the community, the higher the level of 
support for both non-violent and violent action. Terrorism expert Marc Sageman also 
uses a combination of social network analysis and what he calls “moral outrage” to 
explain the process of radicalization.35 By moral outrage Sageman means “a reaction to 
perceived major moral violations, like killings, rapes, or local police actions.”36 He 
believes that individuals come together in small groups bound by friendship and kinship 
over a shared reaction to this moral outrage that is shaped by a particular world view. 
                                                 
32 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism,” 
418. 
33 Peter James Burke, Contemporary Social Psychological Theories (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), 111–36. 
34 Dina Al Raffie, “Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora,” 
Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 4 (2013): 67–91. 
35 Marc Sageman, “A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists,” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008): 223–231. 
36 Ibid., 225. 
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Given the above discussion, the following terms will be used to investigate 
extremism as a wide phenomenon.  
 Radicalization: The Process of Becoming More Extreme by Departing 
from Socially Accepted Ideas/Beliefs 
This definition draws from McCauley and Moskalenko, who define radicalization 
as the “change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify 
intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the in-group.”37 However, 
McCauley and Moskalenko’s definition focuses specifically on a narrow behavioral 
output: violence. In subsequent definitions, this thesis will expand the range of behavioral 
outputs associated with extreme beliefs. This distinction is important because it provides 
a wider range of options to counter extremism. Chapter III will expand upon this process 
in greater detail.  
 Normal: An Individual Who Holds Beliefs or Views within the Current 
Range of Cultural or Societal Norms and Values 
This definition draws from social psychologist Marie Jahoda, who argues that the 
concept of normal varies “with the time, place, culture, and expectations of the social 
group.”38 This definition, therefore, is rooted within socially accepted norms and values, 
with the understanding that those norms and values will change over time. Furthermore, 
this definition also acknowledges that sub-groups have their own definition of normal; in 
other words, each sub-group will have normal and extreme views.  
 Extremist: An Individual Who Holds Beliefs or Views Vastly Different 
from the Current Cultural or Societal Norms and Values 
As previously discussed, Horgan argues that a broad spectrum of extremists 
exists, and that extremists perform various roles and functions based on their beliefs and 
capabilities.39 He further contends that within the spectrum of extremism there is a 
migration from legal to illegal activities, and the illegal and violent acts perpetrated by an 
                                                 
37 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism,” 
416.  
38 Marie Jahoda, Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health (New York: Basic Books, 1958), 
http://psycnet.apa.org/books/11258/. 
39 Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on 
Radicalization into Terrorism.” 
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extremist movement “could not be developed, evolved or sustained over time and place” 
without the support of those who support and operate in the legal and gray areas.40 As 
such, the common underlying attribute of extremists is their beliefs, which are outside of 
societal held norms and values. 
 Latent Extremist: An Individual Who Holds or Supports Extremist Beliefs, 
but Is Unable or Unwilling to Take Action 
As Horgan identifies, many of the members of extremist movements do not 
participate in illegal activities, but still hold the same beliefs, active or dormant, as those 
who carry out illegal acts.41 McCauley and Moskalenko echo this claim with their 
inclusion of the inert category.42 This category is comprised of extremists who are only a 
grievance away from moving further down the radicalization process. Mao’s treatise On 
Guerrilla Warfare describes this category as “the mass base,” which supports an 
ideology, but is operationally dormant. For the mass base to become active, it needs to 
identify with a grievance in order to voluntarily take on an active, operational role in 
defense of the ideology.43 
 Activist Extremist: An Individual Who Commits Ideologically Motivated 
Activism in Support of Their Extremist Beliefs and Values 
This definition draws on literature on radicalization that argues that activism is a 
stage in the radicalization process; however, there has been little effort to disaggregate 
normal activism from extremist activism in a clear and concise definition. McCauley and 
Moskalenko define activists as those “who are engaged in legal political action for a 
cause.”44 However, this definition does not separate socially normal activism, such as 
civil disobedience in support of human rights, from extremist activism, such as 
propagating literature in support of extremist violence or behavior. Thus, the proposed 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Some Things We Think We’ve Learned since 9/11: A Commentary 
on Marc Sageman’s “the Stagnation in Terrorism Research.”“ 
43 Tse-tung Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare (JVB Books, 1961), 72–73.  
44 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Some Things We Think We’ve Learned since 9/11: A Commentary 
on Marc Sageman’s “the Stagnation in Terrorism Research,”“ 602.  
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term “Activist Extremist” is beneficial in that it clearly delineates the normal and 
extremist ideas from the activist’s behavior.  
 Criminal Extremist: An individual Who Commits Ideologically Motivated 
Criminal Acts without the Intent to Inflict Human Harm or Death in 
Support of Their Extremist Beliefs and Values 
In their book, Investigative Psychology, Canter and Youngs argue that there is a 
distinction between crimes against persons and those against property.45 They show that 
criminals tend to commit more than one crime and that their crimes tend to be related. 
We expand this distinction to denote the existence of criminal extremists (property) and 
violent extremists (person).  
 Violent Extremist: An Individual Who Commits Ideologically Motivated 
Violence with the Intent to Inflict Human Harm or Death in Support of 
Their Extremist Beliefs and Values46 
Building off of Canter and Youngs, this definition differentiates the intended 
output of violence from other less lethal acts, such as property crimes. Further, 
sociologist Christian Smith argues that religions provide moral directive for behavior.47 
Thus, based on Smith’s proposition, ideology provides a moral framework to create the 
conditions for the individual or group to morally accept violence as a justified action in 
response to their grievances. 
F. THE INTERSECTION OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS 
In addition to defining extremism, it is also important to examine the role that unit 
of analysis plays in understanding extremism. The NYPD model is one of many theories 
that posit that radicalization occurs at the individual level.48 Other individual theories 
have been used to explain radicalization. For example, rational choice theory posits that 
individuals make decisions based on the examination of risk and rewards, or cost and 
                                                 
45 Canter and Youngs, Investigative Psychology: Offender Profiling and the Analysis of Criminal 
Action. 
46 White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 1. 
47 Christian Smith and Michael Emerson, American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
48 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. 
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benefits.49 For the researcher using rational choice to explain extremism, the individual 
calculates that the benefits exceed the costs, even the ultimate cost of life. Another theory 
that focuses on radicalization at the individual level is identity theory, which posits that 
each individual has a host of sub-identities that form into pyramids of prominence 
(importance) and salience (situationally activated); these two variables provide insight 
into the development of the extremist identity.50 Identity theory provides another useful 
foundation for understanding individual identity as part of the radicalization process.  
Another theory that explains extremism at the individual level is social network 
theory, which examines the ties between individuals. This theory argues that ties between 
individuals have a greater impact on behavior than individual attributes do.51 Social 
network analysis provides a wealth of data on ties between individuals and their role in 
the radicalization process.  
Theories also exist that posit extremism occurs at the group level. One such 
theory, proposed by Al Raffie, is rooted in social identity.52 Social identity theory 
proposes a process of self-categorization that forms identity in groups.53 Social identity 
theory differs from identity theory in that it provides the social level, not the individual 
level, as the center of causality. Social identity theory is useful for studying radicalization 
because of its focus on in-group favoritism and intergroup conflict. In-group favoritism 
refers to the process of favorably comparing an individual in a perceived group higher 
than an individual that is outside the perceived group.54 Intergroup conflict is the result of 
competition over resources in a finite space, which benefits one group over another.55  
                                                 
49 Burke, Contemporary Social Psychological Theories, 70–87. 
50 Ibid., 88–110. 
51 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
52 Al Raffie, “Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora.” 
53 Burke, Contemporary Social Psychological Theories, 111–36. 




Finally, sub-cultural identity theory argues that all people search for meaning and 
belonging, which is often found in groups.56 Though sub-cultural identity theory 
originally was developed to explain the strength of modern religious institutions, it 
provides a wider perspective on a fundamental human principle, the drive for meaning in 
life.  
G. CONCLUSION 
No single theory provides a clear answer to the radicalization process. The 
number of theories in each of these schools of thought suggests that both the individual 
and group levels are important for explaining what causes extremism. Furthermore, new 
theories should attempt to understand the interaction between the individual and social 
level.  
In the next chapter, a more thorough explanation will be provided on the 
dynamics of the interaction of the individual and his or her social ties. The focus of this 
work will attempt to bridge the two classical schools of thought and examine the 
individual(s) within the social landscape in which they exist. Analyzing the interplay of 
individual identity and social ties provides a deeper understanding than an analysis of 
either could provide alone. 
                                                 
56 Smith and Emerson, American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving. 
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III. MODELS OF RADICALIZATION 
The process of radicalization has become important to more than just policy 
makers, law enforcement officials and academics. Communities across the United States 
have taken steps to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack in their community. However, 
despite these efforts the process of radicalization is still shrouded in mystery, as is the 
role that radicalization plays in perpetrating terrorist acts. If a more thorough 
understanding of the process of radicalization can be achieved, the multitude of 
stakeholders will be significantly more capable of addressing this important social and 
security issue.  
In this chapter, we will provide insight into radicalization by reviewing some of 
the prominent explanations for the process leading to extremism. We then will propose a 
new framework for understanding radicalization. The first section will offer an 
examination of current theories and frameworks that have been used to describe the 
radicalization process.57 The second section will present a new radicalization framework 
that builds upon existing radicalization literature. Ultimately, this chapter will provide 
stakeholders with a framework that investigates the dynamic interaction of identity, social 
environment, grievances, and other catalytic factors that influence an individual in the 
radicalization process. It will further provide stakeholders with a common language that 
may be used to discuss the potential degree of risk individuals may pose, depending upon 
their progression in the radicalization process. The aim is to identify more effective 
intervention programs to facilitate individual departure from the radicalization process. 
                                                 
57 Some of the existing models of radicalization and theories include Identity Theory, Social Identity 
Theory, Identity Control Theory, National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) Radicalization Framework, 
the NYPD (New York Police Department) Model, McCauley and Moskalenko’s Pathways Framework, 
Moghaddam’s Staircase Framework, and McCall and Simmons Prominence and Salience Pyramids. 
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A. NCTC 
In 2011, the U.S. National Counter-Terrorism Center developed a radicalization 
model.58 This model is comprised of three stages: radicalization, mobilization and action 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  NCTC Radicalization Framework59 
As the model shows there are a number of factors that lead to radicalization, but 
only the large groupings, such as personal factors, are labeled. Furthermore, the model 
provides the idea that some factors act as a catalyst for the radicalization process and 
some act as an inhibitor. These factors are not identified, but this concept is important in 
the creation of a more sophisticated explanation of radicalization. However, the model 
does not provide a clear definition of who is an extremist and who is not, nor does it 
provide detail about how or when an individual moves from one stage to the next. 
One strong point of the model is the universal nature of the labels. This model can 
be applied across racial, religious and national boundaries. The assumption inherent in 
this model is that the psychosocial process of radicalization is not unique to any one 
                                                 
58 Keys-Turner, “The Violent Islamic Radicalization Process: A Framework for Understanding”; The 
citation provided is a broken link but the information on the model was publicly available at the time. 
59 Keys-Turner, “The Violent Islamic Radicalization Process: A Framework for Understanding.” 
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group, but is the result of a combination of factors that coalesce over time under the 
necessary and sufficient conditions. The model also seeks to identify the drivers at each 
stage and acknowledges the fact that some factors can act in an inhibitive manner, 
retarding the process.  
B. MCCAULEY AND MOSKALENKO’S PATHWAYS 
Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko argue that radicalization is not a 
process, but occurs on a multitude of specific pathways or mechanisms.60 Furthermore, 
they argue that radicalization cannot be explained by one overarching theory, but 
constructing a loose framework may be possible.61 Specifically, they envision two 
pyramids, ideas and actions, which are related. They suggest pathways that range from 
individual through group to mass levels. Each mechanism is explained with plausible 
scenarios involving individual causes, such as personal victimization.  The pathway 
argument, however, does not identify why some people experience personal grievances 
and yet do not conduct an attack. Figure 5 shows the 12 mechanisms proposed by 
McCauley and Moskalenko.  
 
Figure 5.  Pathways to Violence: Mechanisms of Political Radicalization at 
Individual, Group, and Mass-public Levels62 
                                                 
60 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism.” 
61 Ibid., 429. 
62 Ibid., 418. 
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C. AL RAFFIE’S EXPLANATION  
Dina Al Raffie examines social identity theory as a cause of radicalization.63 
Specifically, Al Raffie examines the role of identity in the formation of intragroup liking 
and intergroup competition. In a departure from other studies, she also examines the role 
of non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) influence on communities in the promotion 
of extremist ideology, in this case militant Islam. While some NGOs exert a positive 
influence in diaspora communities to promote pluralism and help immigrants integrate 
into society, other NGOs may be fueling extremist ideologies and acting as radicalizing 
agents in the community.64  
Al Raffie also points out that the human ego and self-esteem are powerful drivers 
of human behavior and shed light on this process.65 In some diaspora populations, real 
and perceived discrimination drives individuals to reinforce shared values, in this case 
Islamic values. As individuals navigate the process to reconcile conflicting identities, 
such as national identity and religious identity, the identity that strengthens self-esteem 
may be favored over the other.66  
While Al Raffie clearly articulates that social identity theory may not explain all 
paths to radicalization, the role of identity is extremely prominent in some cases.67 The 
role of the peer and social system emerges as a strong indicator in the social identity 
theory explanation for radicalization. Finally, both the role of the individual commitment 
to the group and the group’s identity also must be considered in the shaping of radical 
beliefs.  
                                                 
63 Al Raffie, “Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora.”  
64 Al Raffie, “Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora,” 90. 
65 Ibid., 77. 
66 Ibid., 83–84. 
67 Ibid., 89. 
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D. NYPD MODEL OF RADICALIZATION 
The NYPD developed a process centric radicalization model in 2007.68 The 
NYPD model articulates a four stage process that an individual passes through in the 
radicalization process: pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and 
jihadization.69 The model argues that each of the phases is unique and that individuals 
who progress through the process do not necessarily pass through all the stages linearly, 
but may in fact skip phases, stall out, or disengage at any given point. However, the end 
result of an individual who progress through all four stages of the process is a violent 
extremist.70 Despite discussion of the stages of radicalization, the model does not provide 
any descriptive linkages to account for how or why some individuals do not follow the 
linear progression. Furthermore, they do not link stages to conditions that explain the 
causes for progression from one stage to another (i.e., lack of conflict resolution 
mechanism).  
The NYPD model, depicted in Figure 6, shows the process of radicalization based 
on NYPD’s Senior Intelligence Analysts Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt’s work on nine 
case studies, including the Hamburg cell that conducted the 9/11 attacks.  
                                                 
68 The NYPD model was designed specifically in an effort to understand the domestic radicalization 
process of Islamic inspired violent extremism. 
69 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. 
70 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, 21. 
 30 
 
Figure 6.  NYPD Model of Radicalization71 
In this process, the individual begins at a point before being exposed to any kind 
of change that would initiate a journey through the radicalization process, the pre-
radicalization stage. Next, Silber and Bhatt argue that the individual is exposed to radical 
ideology and he or she begins to self-identify with the cause of the movement.72 The 
authors see a “cognitive opening” that challenges previously held beliefs, opening the 
door for the movement’s ideology.73 The third stage is indoctrination, whereby the 
individual strengthens his or her beliefs in the ideology.74 Fourth, the individual moves 
into the final stage, “jihadization” whereby the individual accepts a duty to conduct 
attacks in support of the cause. Terrorist attacks are likely to follow the completion of the 
process and can occur quickly. Although the model is Islam-centric, it in no way makes 
any value judgment on Islam or assumes that radicalization is solely an Islamic problem. 
The authors of the model note that many individuals who begin this process do 
not complete it. Furthermore, the length of time that an individual spends in each stage 
can vary. However, the authors also note that the majority of the cases examined follow 
remarkably similar trajectories indicating the behavioral consistency of the process.75 The 
process is also usually sparked by a search for an identity that allows for the individual to 
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go astray and eventually join the movement. Silber and Bhatt further argue that no profile 
exists to explain why individuals may be turning toward terrorism.76 However, the cases 
the NYPD examined as part of this study highlighted the role that political grievances 
played in newly radicalized individuals and for violent action.77 
A key concept identified is the role of influential figures or common locations in 
the process of radicalization, which Silber and Bhatt call “radicalization incubators.”78 
These people or places produce high numbers of extremists. Individuals often begin the 
radicalization process alone, but then interact with like-minded individuals as part of the 
process that reinforces their path toward radicalization. The Internet is also cited as a 
special source of concern for radicalization, where individuals can complete large 
portions of the radicalization process without any local connection. For this reason, they 
refer to the Internet as the “virtual incubator.”79 
One limit in the model is the lack of specificity on when an individual is in one 
stage as opposed to the other, or more importantly, what causes an individual to move 
from one stage to the other. Clear distinctions between phases will be helpful for law 
enforcement officers, policy makers and community leaders who are not as familiar with 
the literature on radicalization, but still want/need to help fight radicalization in their 
jurisdiction. 
Another limit of the model is that Silber and Bhatt posit that individuals will 
exhibit specific traits or attributes at each stage of the process, but do not provide clear 
evidence of the traits. Further research should attempt to identify the specific attributes 
with the ultimate goal of developing strategies to intervene early in the process. 
Furthermore, and perhaps most important for this thesis, the NYPD model does not 
account for participation in activism, does not discuss the impact of the social 
environment on the process of radicalization sufficiently, and does not discuss the 
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formation of the extremist identity in detail. These important issues need to be addressed 
in order to interdict individual’s escalation towards radicalization. 
E. BUILDING ON EXISTING THEORIES AND MODELS  
Several theories contribute to the model proposed below. The theory that provides 
a foundation for the CITIG framework is social network analysis (SNA). The basic 
premise of social network analysis is that individuals, called actors, have ties to other 
individuals who influence their behavior.80 “A social network is a finite set or sets of 
actors that [sic] share ties with one another.”81 Ties are categorized as strong and weak 
along a continuum. A “SNA assumption is that ties (i.e., relations) between actors can 
function as conduits for the diffusion of various types of material and nonmaterial 
“goods,” such as information, feelings, financial resources, norms, diseases, opinions, 
and trust.”82 Strong ties are connections to individuals who are close to the actor and 
repeatedly engage with the actor. Weak ties are not as close, but allow for the individual 
to cross boundaries and connect to different groups. In general, strong ties reinforce 
beliefs, and weak ties diffuse new ideas and connect people to new groups.  
Networks can also be dense, with a lot of close ties, or sparse, with relatively few 
ties. “Network density is positively related to the likelihood that actors within the 
network will follow accepted norms and behavior, which is why a primary basis for 
moral order is highly connected in social networks.”83 One reason that sociologist Sean 
Everton provides for the influence of ties on individuals is that “SNA assumes that actors 
do not make decisions as autonomous units but instead are strongly influenced by the 
behavior and choices of other actors.”84 Overall SNA provides insight into the structure 
and patterns of social engagement that occur throughout the radicalization process. 
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Social identity theory is also a useful theory for a model of radicalization. 
Sociologist Henri Tajfel argues that social identity theory is a process of self-
categorization whereby an individual finds a sense of belonging in specific groups within 
the greater social structure by dividing the world into in-groups (us) and out-groups 
(them) in order to enhance his or her own self-image.85 This process is completed 
through a system of social categorization, social identification, and social comparison 
where an individual stereotypes, based on normal cognitive processes, through 
exaggerating the differences between groups and the similarities of things in the same 
group to create a paradigm of us versus them.  
In the social categorization stage, an individual categorizes others into broad 
groups in order to understand and identify them. From this process, individuals are able 
to define appropriate behaviors, based on the norms and values of the categorized groups, 
in order to integrate or exclude themselves from specific groups. In the social 
identification stage, an individual will adopt the identity of the group they have 
categorized themselves into, resulting in their emotional integration into the group with 
their self-esteem bound up within the group membership and said group’s favorable 
comparison with other groups. This step leads to the social comparison stage where, in 
order to maintain the collective self-esteem of group members, intergroup comparison 
occurs, which perpetuates competition and hostility. If competition leads to a favorable 
comparison of a group, the self-esteem of the individuals within the group will increase. 
However, if the group comparison suffers, then the self-esteem of the collective 
individuals will also decrease. This process requires groups to continually seek favorable 
position over other groups within the social space.86 
Of equal importance, identity theory articulates the process of identification. 
Identity theory posits that an individual has multiple identities that exist simultaneously 
and they can be classified as person based, role based, or group based identities.87 For 
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each identity, the individual has a set of meanings88 that are important when an identity is 
activated. Within this process, two terms are necessary: prominence and salience. 
Prominence is how important a sub-identity is to the individual within the context of the 
multiple identities that make up the whole of the individual.89 Salience is the activation of 
a sub-identity selected from the prominence hierarchy based on an individual’s current 
situational context.90  
McCall and Simmons propose a hierarchy of prominence and salience separately 
(Figure 7).91 The hierarchy is a useful conceptualization in this instance because it is 
clear that certain identities will take priority over others. Which identity takes precedence 
is a matter of context, but identities that are more prominent (at the top of the pyramid) 
will guide the actions of other identities. Furthermore, prominence impacts salience.92 
Salience will shift based on a given context, but the prominence pyramid is relatively 
stable and does not change quickly, unless a severe event, such as joining a religious cult 
or being held captive in a prisoner of war camp, necessitates a change.93 Burke 
illuminates that a significant shift in ties creates the conditions where a change in identity 
will occur. These contexts occur in numerous macro and micro social environments and 
can be the result of the loss of strong familial ties (clans or tribes), emigration or as a 
result of the effects of war. 
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Figure 7.  Prominence and Salience Pyramids94 
In identity control theory (ICT), a separate yet related theory, Burke posits a 
mechanism of control for the multiple identities using a hierarchical perceptual control 
system.95 “Within, ICT, an identity is viewed as a set of self-relevant meanings held as 
standards for the identity in question.”96 The set of meanings that define each identity is 
known as the identity standard. When an identity is activated, the set of meanings is used 
as a guide to measure behavior against; when a behavior matches the standard, the 
identity is verified through a calculation called identity verficaiton.97 If the identity 
standard is not verified, it produces an error, which in turn creates dissonance and 
provides the motivation for change.98 Once the error has been reduced, the drive for 
change goes away, restoring balance to the control system. The error produces both 
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cognitive and emotional reactions, positive feelings for verification and distress for 
errors.99  
This process of validation occurs in each identity. If multiple identities are 
activated at the same time, as in a situation where a child is in the presence of both 
parents and friends, the potential for contradiction in identity standards occurs as certain 
aspects of the child’s behavior associated with the “friend” identity produces a clash or 
error with the “child” identity associated with the parents. In this case, if two identities 
are opposing, the individual can choose to deactivate one identity, renegotiate the 
discrepancy between the two standards, or enact the standard of the identity with a higher 
salience.100 It is in this case when the child is in the presence of his or her parents that the 
“child” identity is activated while the “friend” identity is deactivated to produce 
behaviors that are acceptable to the parents due to the stronger ties the child has with the 
parents within this or her person based identity over the weaker ties in the group based 
identity. In testing the change of multiple identities over time, Burke shows that person 
based identities act as a higher control system with role and group based identities 
operating as subordinate identities.101 In this case, role or group identities will not control 
behavior as strongly as person based identities. Over time role and group identities can 
cause changes to the identity standard of person based identities. The strength of 
commitment to the identity and the number of ties based on the identity are determining 
factors in which identities are strengthened over time and which are weakened.102 Burke 
argues “[b]ecause high salience and strong commitment characterize the person identity, I 
also suggest that it may operate like a master identity and that it may be higher in the 
control hierarchy than social or role identities.”103 The concept of a master identity that 
has direct effects on other social and role identities is crucial in the understanding of the 
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radicalization process. An extremist identity that controls all behavior and has the power 
to deactivate conflicting identities provides a powerful explanation for radicalization. 
Building upon the foundation of the NYPD, this thesis proposes a new framework 
consisting of four stages (Figure 8). Stage One begins with a personal crisis that is 
exacerbated by antecedent conditions, such as a lack of strong social ties that typically 
provide an individual with support networks and grounding within their existing identity 
and social structure. In a search to resolve the crisis, an individual will make new ties or 
find new ideologies, which will result in the formation of a new identity that will 
continue to evolve throughout the radicalization process. Stage Two consists of the 
reframing of the personal crisis that links the evolving identity to a grievance through 
indoctrination that may precede or follow contact with extremists. An individual will 
progress from Stage Two to Stage Three when they take action associated with the 
extremist identity to gain acceptance and approval (identity verification) of the in-group. 
In Stage Three the individual begins activism on behalf of the perceived grievances of the 
new extremist identity. The lack of a resolution mechanism is the catalyst for the 
individual in Stage Four where the extremist begins operational planning to execute a 
specific action, criminal or violent, with which to force a resolution to their grievance. 
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Figure 8.  CITIG Radicalization Framework 
1. Stage 1: Personal Crisis 
This framework posits that the process begins with a personal crisis that is 
compounded by antecedent conditions, and this crisis affects an individual’s personal 
and/or social identity. 
Burke argues that identity change from crises can be both endogenous and 
exogenous.104 He names two endogenous sources of change: the lack of identity 
verification and innovation within current identities.105 He further identifies three 
exogenous sources of change: a change in resource flows through a social structure, a 
change in size of the social structure, and the redefinition of role identities by a higher 
authority.106 McCauley and Moskalenko’s twelve mechanisms for radicalization offer an 
extensive list of the personal crises that might spark the process of radicalization, from 
the individual through the mass level.107 The presence of both individual and group crises 
                                                 
104 Burke, “Identities and Social Structure: The 2003 Cooley-Mead Award Address,” 13. 
105 Ibid., 12. 
106 Ibid. 
107 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward 
Terrorism.” 
 39 
indicates that both individual and collective identities can be present in the radicalization 
process. Moghaddam generalizes that Islamic communities around the world are 
experiencing an identity crisis.108 
A number of antecedent conditions can also exasperate the crisis. One factor is the 
lack of both strong and weak ties that provide social support to resolve the crisis. As a 
result of the lack of ties, the individual attempts to search for resolution to their crisis 
within new ties that lead them to extremist ideologies. Another aggravating factor is low 
status; Burke argues that individuals with low status are more likely to change their 
identity because they are not able to verify their identity and provide meaning in their 
life.109 Sageman also argues that a search for “glory and thrills” is one of the main drivers 
of radicalization,110 indicating that identity verification is an important part of the 
process. 
Silber and Bhatt argue that the individual drifts away from their old identity in 
search of a new one.111 The result is the formation of a new identity that will continue to 
evolve as new ties are formed within their personal network and as the individual is 
further indoctrinated within the extremist ideology. Combined, the evolving identity, the 
new ties and indoctrination reinforce the individual’s sense of identity within a group and 
its greater social structure.  
The process of identity formation under specific circumstances is useful for 
understanding the path to radicalization. Radicalized identities are separate and distinct 
from their larger communities (Jihadis within the Muslim ummah, or eco-extremists 
within environmentalism) because they have a unique ideology, established norms, 
taboos and practices.  
Furthermore, the variance in when radicalization occurs can be explained, in part, 
by specific types of identity formation. Radicalization is a difficult concept to study in 
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part because it occurs at many different points in an individual’s life and in many 
different places. Literature has identified prison radicalization,112 Internet 
radicalization,113 radicalization on college campuses,114 radicalization among diaspora 
populations,115 radicalization among overseas workers,116 and radicalization of 
individuals ranging from childhood to very late in life. Environments like prison and 
university campuses are places that require individuals to adapt and often form new 
identities as a result of new relationships.  
2. Stage 2: New Identity 
During Stage Two, a few separate yet interconnected actions take place: the 
individual makes contact with other extremists, becomes indoctrinated into the ideology 
of the identity and connects to the grievances associated with the identity. These steps 
may not occur in the same sequence for each individual. One individual may make 
contact with an extremist that directs him to more ideological indoctrination, or an 
individual may self-indoctrinate through various forms of media and then seek contact 
with other extremists.  
In reality, it is difficult to pull apart the interactive nature of ideas and personal 
ties. Silber and Bhatt discuss the interactive nature of the search for meaning in the new 
identity: 
Most often the vehicles for these exposures include family ties or old 
friendships, social networks, religious movements like the Tablighi 
Jamaat, political movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, or extremist-
like discussions in halal butcher shops, cafes, gyms, student associations, 
study groups, non-governmental organizations and, most importantly, the 
Internet.117 
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Contact with extremists is a crucial part of Stage Two. Social network analysis 
offers a useful framework for understanding the role that contact with other extremists 
plays in radicalization. Silber and Bhatt find that individuals usually start the 
radicalization process alone and then seek contact with like-minded individuals.118 
Sageman argues that radicalization occurs through ties of friendship and kinship, 
which would be classified as strong ties, in his “bunch of guys” explanation for the wave 
of contemporary attacks in the United States.119 Silber, Bhatt, and Sageman all assert that 
individual clusters tend to act through inspiration, rather than through direct command 
and control,120 indicating that ties play an important role throughout the radicalization 
process. The beliefs and values of the people in the “ego network”121 have great impact 
on the beliefs and values of the individual. This approach expands the understanding of 
the phenomenon from a strictly psychological perspective to a larger psychosocial lens. 
As the individual strengthens the new identity, weak ties to extremists will be 
made. The individual chooses whether or not to associate with these extremists and 
chooses whether to maintain the current contacts in the ego network. As the radicalization 
process continues, more contact with extremists will cause the severing of strong ties that 
restrain extremist beliefs and actions, thereby causing the migration of the actor from the 
periphery of their previous network into that of the extremist network. 
Identities compete with each other for salience in a given situation, which overall 
affects prominence.122 McCauley and Moskalenko argue that groups or individuals who 
are socially isolated can progress through the radicalization process faster because of the 
lack of prosocial influences.123 The number of ties and the strength of the ties associated 
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with an identity provide a way to evaluate which identity will have a stronger influence 
on behavior. Everton argues that ties influence behavior through a fear of losing the ties 
and the value that they provide.124 When the extremist identity is in competition with the 
existing identities, the number and strength of ties will help explain which identity is 
activated. 
To understand the dynamics of identity change, Burke examines the changes of 
multiple identities over time. He tests the effects that the birth of a child has on the 
female gender identity and spousal role identity over time.125 He finds that the exogenous 
crisis (birth of a child) causes changes to both the gender and role identities, but that the 
changes in gender identity had effects on the spouse role identity, indicating an 
interaction in identities.126 The change occurs on points of similarity between multiple 
identities, such as the degree of femininity/masculinity of the gender identity and the 
spousal identity.  
Through the same process, when an individual assumes an identity, such as a 
white supremacist or jihadi, cognitive dissonance occurs because of the contradiction of 
the new identity and old ones. The beliefs of the previous identities are called into 
question and often must be changed through cognitive restructuring. It can be difficult to 
reconcile an existing belief of equality with the intolerance and exclusivity of the white 
supremacy ideology. Burke suggests that individuals manage this dissonance by selective 
interaction, choosing whom to associate with to reduce dissonance.127 As individuals 
progress through the stages of the model and disengage from prosocial peers, identities 
that are not directly supporting the new identity may be purged from the salience 
pyramid. With fewer identities competing in the salience pyramid, the new identity will 
be activated more frequently.  
Weak ties are also extremely important in the radicalization process. Granovetter 
argues that weak ties can have profound impact on the individual, opening new 
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opportunities in the social space.128 A weak tie with an extremist may begin the 
indoctrination into the ideology or provide new frames that alter the ideology. In the 
context of actions, weak ties can also provide operational assistance, such as bomb-
making skills, intelligence on a target, or operational security practices. Sageman further 
articulates this process by describing how individuals, or nodes, come in contact with 
hubs, which are nodes with many links or weak ties. These hubs function as facilitators 
that provide other nodes, or individuals, with ties to further indoctrination, material, or 
resources.129 He further argues: 
Weak ties to a clique can be a bridge to jihad. In many social processes 
such as getting a job, learning about new information and spreading fads 
or rumors, weak ties are more important than strong friends. In a world of 
cliques, strong friends lump together into separate groups. So far, there is 
no connection between them and they are in danger of social implosion, 
totally disconnected from the rest of the world. What keeps these cliques 
connected to each other are weak ties, linking certain members of one 
clique to another. These ties are not strong enough to include the outside 
individuals in the clique. But thy play a crucial role in bridging the clique 
to the rest of the world…weak ties play this crucial role in bringing 
enthusiastic new candidates to the jihad. This is a self-generating process 
from below rather than a recruitment drive from above.130 
Based on Sageman’s observation, we concur that without these weak ties, the 
radicalizing individual and/or groups may stall in the process. Individuals or groups may 
need critical resources, such as the material to make a bomb or information on which 
target is appropriate to attack. However, some individuals and small groups have 
completed the process and conducted successful attacks without these weak ties, which is 
why the weak ties should be viewed as a catalytic factor more than a necessary condition. 
Second, the subject of ideology has been given a lot of attention in the media in 
the post 9/11 world. Sageman believes that the subject of ideology has received too much 
attention.131 Indoctrination into an ideology may not include a deep and nuanced view of 
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the Islamic faith for the jihadists, but ideology has some key components that are 
necessary to the radicalization process: the identity standard (beliefs, values and 
behaviors associated with the identity), the inclusion or exclusion of groups of people, the 
identification of “the enemy,” and grievances. 
Revisiting the concept of the identity standard in the context of indoctrination, 
ideology creates the set of meanings that are relevant to the extremist identity. The 
identity standard is the set of meanings that guide behavior, when an identity is activated, 
and provides the specific norms in relation to an identity.132 The identity standard 
dictates specific positions along a dimension, such as “good and bad, dominant and 
submissive, or party going and studious.”133 The indoctrination process can be looked at 
as nothing more than acquiring the identity standard associated with the extremist 
identity. Indoctrination traditionally has a negative connotation because of the extreme 
beliefs that are associated with the identity standard. The individual incorporates the new 
elements of the identity standard into their existing identity pyramid. As the individual 
continues to interact with other extremists, their identity standard will be verified, but 
their other identities may be altered to fit the new meanings held in the extremist identity 
standard. 
Furthermore, it is important to identify the in-group, the out-group (target) and the 
specific action that is advocated. Jihadist groups outside the United States who are 
focused on sectarian violence may pose little threat to the United States and yet are 
extremely dangerous to certain minority groups in their country of origin. By contrast, 
white supremacists identify a very narrow in-group, a very broad out-group (Jews, 
homosexuals, and all other races), but often encourage violence against African-
Americans. While an initial look at the ideology of a particular group or larger extremist 
community may reveal one set of beliefs, targets, and methods, Snow, Rochford, Worden 
and Benford argue that ideology can change over time by frame transformation.134 One 
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example of frame transformation in jihadist ideology is the transformation of focusing on 
the near enemy to the far enemy as advocated by Al Qaeda. Ideology, like identity and 
networks, is dynamic and responds to both situational and cognitive factors. 
In his work on the effects of religion on adolescents Christian Smith argues that 
religion provides moral justification and guidance for action;135 in a similar way, 
ideologies also provide moral justification for action. For example, the eco-extremist 
ideology that exists in the United States today, based on biocentrism, forbids the taking of 
human life; instead it focuses on economic attacks, often arson, on labs that conduct 
research using animals, corporate buildings, or equipment.136 By contrast, the white 
supremacist and jihadi ideologies argue that the use of violence is necessary to bring 
social and political change.  
The radicalizing individual may be indoctrinated into the ideology in a variety of 
ways. The Internet, contact with others, and traditional media are all sources of 
indoctrination. An individual may be mobilized by a particular event in global politics, or 
may conduct research on the Internet, or connect to other people through chat rooms or 
email. Silber and Bhatt highlight the Internet as both a driver and an enabler of 
radicalization because it provides unfiltered access to ideology.137 It is likely that the 
medium does not affect the process; it is just the vehicle to obtain the ideology and make 
contact with others. Terrorism researcher Akil Awan, for example, claims that the notion 
of Internet radicalization is a red herring and the rise of the Internet radicalization term 
may just be a sign that more media and communication are moving to the Internet.138  
The third component of this stage of radicalization is identification with 
grievances. Grievances are especially important to understand the process of 
radicalization. The identity prominence pyramid provides a helpful lens for 
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understanding which grievances are important to a radicalizing individual. Grievances are 
everywhere in society, but without understanding the prominent identities that an 
individual or group holds, it is impossible to understand which grievances are relevant. 
McCauley and Moskalenko argue that, when an individual or group feels their identity is 
under attack, the need to retaliate in some way is amplified.139 
Grievances are another necessary condition. McCauley, for example, attempts to 
empirically test different mechanisms including political grievance.140 He finds that 
“[p]olitical grievance, represented by opposition to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, is the best 
predictor of a political judgment that the war on terrorism is actually a war on Islam and 
also predicts favorable opinion of Al Qaeda.”141 McCauley and Moskalenko argue that 
severe traumatic events, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the terror attacks 
of 9/11, can radicalize large numbers of people quickly.142 
3. Stage 3: Activism 
With an extremist identity, indoctrination, and a grievance, some individuals will 
move towards activism. Sociologists Pete Simi and Robert Futrell argue that activism 
creates the infrastructure of hate, which is essential for the survival of the white power 
movement.143 Activism serves as the “slippery slope,”144 or the purpose of reinforcing 
the beliefs and values of the movement, connecting with other extremists, and providing 
meaning and belonging for the individual. Silber and Bhatt’s concept of the 
“radicalization incubator”145 is also indicative of the value of activism in the role of 
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strengthening commitment to identity. Simi and Futrell demonstrate the value of activism 
by white power adherents at a backyard bonfire when one individual made the claim that 
it was acceptable to marry an Indian or a Mexican but not a black person, which was 
quickly met with rebuttal.146  
At this point the extremist identity is low in prominence and therefore salience, 
which means it is still subject to the higher order identities and the contact with other 
extremists reinforces the beliefs from Stage Two through identity verification. In their 
study of the maintenance of volunteer behavior over a three year period, social 
psychologists Marta, Manzia, Pozzia, and Vignoles highlight “the more a volunteer 
performs a role, the more he or she will strengthen his or her volunteer role identity and, 
subsequently, will also maintain his or her volunteer activity.”147 Marta et al. also point 
out the role that peers and significant others play in the maintenance of their volunteer 
behavior,148 while Silber and Bhatt describe the same concept, which they call “mental 
reinforcement activities,” which are used to reinforce or renew individual extremist 
beliefs.149 Identity verification is not a singular event, but a constant process that 
constantly either confirms and strengthens the identity or produces an error and causes 
minor changes to the identities.  
With the evolution and broader access to technology, the Internet has expanded 
traditional forms of activism by providing readily accessible and anonymous online 
forums that promote extremist ideas, rhetoric, and images,150 which serve as virtual 
radicalization incubators. Silber and Bhatt argue that such incubators serve as radicalizing 
agents, or nodes, where like-minded individuals are able to congregate, in order to meet 
the distinct cognitive needs of individuals at various stages.151 This process allows for 
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mental reinforcement, as they move through the radicalization process.152 The Internet 
has expanded the role and reach of activist extremist hubs, individuals or nodes with 
numerous links, all of which propagate extremist ideologies within radicalization 
incubators as a dangerous form of activism. Egyptian activist Wael Ghonim, who was 
instrumental in the social media aspect of the Egyptian uprising, emphasizes that many 
people who participated in online activism did not attend physical demonstrations and 
protests.153  
Activism also is helpful in resolving grievances through the political process with 
the passage of a new law or similar mechanism to resolve grievances. With a real or 
perceived inability to resolve the grievance through activism, the individual moves from 
Stage Three to Stage Four. It is worth noting that most extremists do not advance beyond 
Stage Three. McCauley and Moskalenko, for example, find from polling data in the U.S. 
and the UK, “99% of Muslims with radical ideas never engage in radical action.”154 In 
other words, of those that progress to Stage Three, only one percent will progress to 
violent action in Stage Four. This is likely due to a number of factors. As Burke as 
suggests, the greater degree the person based identity that operates as an individual’s 
master identity is overtaken by the extremist identity, the higher degree of cognitive 
association the individual will have with the extremist identity and its networks through 
reinforced “in group, outgroup” association.155 As McCauley and Moskalenko identify, 
this association can lead to an individual perception that attacks on the group are attacks 
on the individual and vise-versa relative to group successes,156 thereby further 
reinforcing the framing of the grievance. 
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4. Stage 4: Criminal or Violent Attack 
Creating the criminal and violent extremist labels, as this thesis does, may allow 
stakeholders and officials to classify the cases they handle more precisely, providing 
better clarity on the scope of the problem. 
This thesis posits that another necessary condition for the progression to Stage 
Four is the actual or perceived lack of a mechanism to address the grievances associated 
with the extremist identity. For example, in his work on religious extremists, Sociologist 
Juergensmeyer argues that the struggle is blocked in real time or in the real world as part 
of his cosmic war theory.157 In addition to the lack of ability to resolve the grievance 
through legal means, the individual or group must believe that action will have a positive 
effect on the outcome in some way. Martyrs believe that they will earn a special place in 
the afterlife by their sacrifice in the present life, thus compelling them to action. The 
white supremacist ideology believes that violent action can spark a race war that will 
bring about the cleansing of all non-pure races.158 The combination of the belief that 
action will have a positive impact and the lack of other means to address the grievance 
helps to explain why the progression from Stage Three to Stage Four is rare.  
Another factor that influences the decision to move from Stage Three to Stage 
Four is the location of the extremist identity. Burke argues that person based identities are 
characterized by high salience and high commitment and therefore “may operate like a 
master identity.”159 After repeated identity verification and an increase in ties to other 
extremists, the extremist identity is likely to rise in prominence to the point at which it 
operates as the master identity. Once the extremist identity is the most prominent identity, 
all other identities will be subordinate to the extremist identity. Burke argues role and 
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group based identities are subordinate to person based identities and that when the two 
are activated together, the more salient will have a greater influence on behavior.160 
While most people traditionally think of extremists only in their violent form, it is 
important to acknowledge that violent extremism is just one option. The eco-terrorist 
movement, associated with the Animal Liberation Front/Earth Liberation Front 
(ALF/ELF), is rich with examples of criminal acts that are motivated by ideology. In 
Stage Four, the different categories of extremism are separated into violent and criminal 
acts to facilitate greater specificity in data collection and analysis.  
a. Criminal Extremist 
The criminal extremist rejects violence against people, but embraces criminal 
action, such as arson, to further the cause or avenge grievances. The eco-terrorist 
movement highlights the actions of the criminal extremist, designed to cause financial 
distress to those that harm the environment, or the individuals perceived to harm the 
environment. The key is these individuals reject violence against people, though 
sometimes people are killed or injured during the attacks. The ideology of the eco-
extremist movements, such as that of the ALF/ELF, do not approve of the taking of 
human life,161 indicating that ideology has an impact on action through the identity 
standard. Criminal extremists may alter their position on violence and move on to 
become violent extremists. This change may be as a result of frustration through 
experience or through ideological innovation.  
b. Violent Extremist 
Finally, violent extremists are the most widely known type of extremist due to the 
media coverage of their actions. While it is still not understood what causes some 
individuals to embrace violence, literature from the assessment of risk in the criminal 
justice system has provided some strong indicators. This research has identified that risk 
should be considered in two forms: risk status (static risk) and risk state (dynamic 
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risk).162 Static risk factors are those that do not change over time, or over short amounts 
of time. Static risk factors that have been associated with violence are age (youth), gender 
(male), history of violence, depression, and low self-esteem.163 On the other hand, 
dynamic risk factors change over time and contribute to the immediate risk state. 
Dynamic risk factors include impulsiveness, negative affectivity (anger, negative mood), 
antisocial attitudes, substance use, and interpersonal relationships.164 Often static factors 
are given too much weight in risk assessment, ignoring the current risk state. Relying too 
much on static factors may increase the assessed level of risk because it ignores the 
dynamic factors. For the individual who has changed and currently poses little risk in the 
dynamic factors, a misdiagnosis could actually lead to a relapse in violence from 
frustration and anger because the hard work to rehabilitate is ignored. Harsh treatment 
based on the potential to commit violence, is much more likely to create violent 
individuals than to pacify them. Risk assessment instruments should focus on both static 
and dynamic factors, but the decision of short term risk should focus more heavily on risk 
state.  
F. ATTRIBUTES 
As described in the NYPD model, Silber and Bhatt argue that individuals will 
exhibit specific attributes at each stage.165 To add additional value, it is useful to identify 
attributes that will be present at each stage in the framework. Pressman offers a risk 
assessment instrument for the assessment of risk for violent extremism.166 VERA, the 
Violent Extremism Risk Assessment Instrument, is designed to be a structured 
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professional judgment (SPJ)167 tool for the assessment of the risk of violent extremism. 
The instrument is similar to other empirically validated risk instruments that yield a low, 
medium, or high risk classification based on a number of factors. The SPJ is designed to 
be used by a variety of different disciplines and represents a solid foundation upon which 
the research can build empirical evidence. Pressman cautions that the reliability of the 
instrument is questionable, and the instrument has yet to be validated. The purpose of the 
instrument is more to generate debate and discussion than to be employed by law 
enforcement and researchers at this point.168 The instrument, in its entirety, is in the 
appendix.  
If the CITIG framework is joined with the attributes of VERA, it is possible to 
achieve the goal of a framework that articulates both how the process occurs and the 
specific attributes that manifest at each stage. A standard SPJ tool does not provide a 
structure that creates causal, or even time-phased, linkages between factors, and, 
therefore, data collection has not considered the order or timing of different variables. 
Not only is the presence of variables important, the timing and relation to other variables 
will be important to codify and record. For instance, if extremist beliefs tend to isolate an 
individual or group from society, then a change in beliefs toward the extreme should 
precipitate the isolation from society.  
In an effort to delineate the severity of risk for violent extremists, Kebbell and 
Porter identify four categories of risk factors: standard, moderate, higher, and extreme.169 
The standard risk factors are super-ordinate non-western identity; perception of western 
policies as being belligerent overseas; perception of domestic counter-terrorism policies 
as being belligerent to them personally and to their community; isolation from positive 
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members of the out-group; young and male; and receipt of welfare payments.170 They 
also highlight that these tend to coincide with the pre-radicalization stage of the NYPD 
model. The moderate factors identified are involvement in religiously motivated charity 
work; religious beliefs that support the use of violence; involvement in perceived 
community defense; accessing jihadist and extremist political materials via the Internet or 
other media; and demonstrated preparedness to use, or advocate the use of, violence.171 
The higher risk factors are membership of, or participation in, radical political groups; 
isolation from non-radical individuals; justification of killing; dehumanization; 
engagement with extremely violent media; and operational capability to commit acts of 
violent extremism.172 In focusing on the operational capability, Kebbell and Porter 
highlight ties between individuals that could be leveraged to gain specific capabilities.173 
Finally, they identity the extreme factors: religiously motivated participation, or 
attempted participation, in overseas conflicts /training for violent extremism; credible 
expressions of desire to kill; credible expression of desire for martyrdom; and target 
selected or target selection. These risk factors are obviously focused toward the Islamic 
inspired form of extremism, but the labels can be generalized to allow for them to apply 
to other forms of extremism. Also, these risk factors are intended only to apply to violent 
extremists, though some might be relevant to the criminal extremist and activist extremist 
as well. The addition of the new behavioral categories might allow for more experimental 
studies to refine risk factors. 
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G. TYPOLOGIES 
Many prominent scholars in the field have articulated different ways to conceive 
of radicalization from pyramids to staircases to unstructured mechanisms.174 All of them 
suggest that the path to radicalization is diverse in many cases, and, therefore, any 
explanation should allow for this diversity. It is possible within the CITIG framework to 
allow for different typologies that manifest different attributes in a similar framework. 
McCauley and Moskalenko propose two separate typologies: the disconnected-disordered 
and the caring-compelled.175 They argue that the disconnected-disordered type is 
categorized by mental health issues, weak social ties, and personal experience with 
weapons outside the military.176 In contrast, the caring-compelled type feel more 
empathy and these feelings push them to act.177 These two types are not mutually 
exclusive from the framework suggested; in fact they may help to validate it. The 
combination of attributes, stages, and longitudinal data will help provide a better 
explanation of the process and will allow for a more nuanced understanding. Smallest 
space analysis, as described in Chapter II, has provided enormous insight into the 
clustering of criminal behaviors, providing clarity for researchers.178 As data collection 
improves, smallest space analysis may help provide empirical support for all of the 
behavioral outputs: activist, criminal, and violent extremists.  
H. CONCLUSION 
The first section of this chapter analyzed supporting theories and recent proposed 
frameworks supporting the radicalization process. From this body of literature, the CITIG 
radicalization framework was proposed, which articulates the interaction of antecedent 
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conditions, individual crisis, identity, extremist indoctrination, and contact with 
extremists that when tied to grievances collectively cause an individual to progress 
through the radicalization process. 
In the next two chapters, the CITIG radicalization framework will be used to 
analyze a broad spectrum of extremist ideologies, as well as both criminal and violent 
extremist outputs. In Chapter IV, the framework will be used to evaluate two Islamic 
inspired case studies, and in Chapter V, it will be used to evaluate a white supremacist 
and an environmental extremist. The case studies will be used evaluate the integrity of 
the CITIG framework and identify a broad range of attributes (cognitive, behavioral, 
contextual, demographic) by stage using VERA as a foundation to refine the risk 
assessment instrument. 
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IV. ISLAMIC-INSPIRED CASE STUDIES 
Radicalization is a complex process. In this chapter, two cases of radicalization 
are presented and analyzed to gain a deeper understanding of the process. Since 9/11 the 
focus of policy makers, law enforcement, and the media has been on Islamic-inspired 
cases of radicalization to violent extremism.  
This chapter describes two case studies of Islamic radicalization selected from the 
FBI’s list of convicted terrorists: Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber; and 
Mohamud Osman Mohamud, the Christmas tree bomber. It uses the CITIG framework 
created in Chapter III to analyze these two cases in the hopes of better understanding how 
these individuals became radicalized.  
The chapter finds support for the CITIG radicalization framework and for the 
VERA instrument. The case studies confirm the importance of social ties and the 
formation and transformation of an extremist identity in the radicalization process. The 
risk factors identified in VERA are generally consistent with the two cases, but a few of 
the factors may need to be refined by future research projects. 
The chapter is broken into four sections. The first section offers a brief review of 
the CITIG framework created in Chapter III. The second section presents two case 
studies of Islamic extremism with specific attributes from the VERA instrument. The 
third section presents an analysis of the similarities and unique factors of the two case 
studies. The fourth section is the conclusion. 
A. RADICALIZATION FRAMEWORK 
The CITIG framework created in Chapter III has four stages. Stage One begins 
with a personal crisis that is exacerbated by antecedent conditions, such as a lack of 
strong social ties that typically provide an individual with support networks and 
grounding within their existing identity and social structure. In a search to resolve the 
crisis an individual will make new ties or find new ideologies, which result in the 
formation of a new identity that will continue to evolve throughout the radicalization 
process. Stage Two consists of the reframing of the personal crisis that links the evolving 
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identity to a grievance through indoctrination that may precede or follow contact with 
extremists. An individual will progress from Stage Two to Stage Three when they take 
actions to gain acceptance and approval (identity verification) of the extremist group. In 
Stage Three the individual begins activism on behalf of the perceived grievances of the 
new extremist identity. Stage Four occurs when there is a lack of a resolution mechanism 
for the grievance or crisis and the extremist begins operational planning to execute a 
specific action, criminal or violent, with which to force a resolution to their grievance. 
In addition to the CITIG radicalization framework, the case studies also provide 
the opportunity to identify specific attributes using the VERA instrument. VERA is the 
first risk assessment instrument developed specifically for violent extremists and each of 
the various factors are scored on a low, medium, and high level. VERA has not been 
empirically validated and, therefore, should not be used to predict risk of violent 
extremism.179 We analyze the factors in VERA to examine the construct validity of the 
instrument. The items in the instrument will also serve as the basis for identifying 
specific attributes that appear at each stage of the radicalization process. 
This framework will be applied to analyze the cases of Faisal Shahzad and 
Mohamud Osman Mohamud. 
1. Case 1: Faisal Shahzad 
Faisal Shahzad was born in Pakistan on June 30, 1979. He grew up in a wealthy 
family and received a good education in his childhood years, although he did not always 
achieve good grades. His father was a military officer in the Pakistani Air Force and 
travelled around when Faisal was young. In 1999, Faisal came to the United States to 
purse an undergraduate degree from Southeastern University, until he transferred and 
completed school at University of Bridgeport in Connecticut. On May 1, 2010, Shahzad 
drove an SUV into Times Square in New York and attempted to detonate the VBIED. 
The path from his arrival in the United States to this attack will be examined using the 
CITIG framework above. 
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a. Stage 1 
Faisal Shahzad came to the United States on January 16, 1999 at the age of 19.180 
While attending University of Bridgeport, Shahzad would go to night clubs in New York 
City and showed little interest in Islam.181 One college friend remarked that Shahzad was 
not very good in school, but had numerous passions outside of school including cars, 
working out, cooking, and art; his friend remarked “back then it was all about fast cars 
and becoming something.”182 This was Shahzad’s life until September 11, 2001. A friend 
of Shahzad’s later noted that a few days after the attacks he said, “They had it 
coming.”183  
For Shahzad, 9/11 served as the personal crisis that began his journey through the 
radicalization process. He believed that the west had conspired to mistreat Muslims.184 
Shahzad identified 9/11 as the beginning of his process of radicalization in a video he 
recorded that was released by Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) after his failed Time Square attack. 
Shahzad further said he wanted to understand why Bin Laden would attack the United 
States, and he found the answer by reading the Qur’an.; Shahzad in fact referred to this 
time as “coming back to Islam.”185 He acknowledged that he was raised as a Muslim, but 
claimed he did not understand his religion, because he had not read the Qur’an. 
Shahzad’s reference to coming back to Islam signaled the creation of his extremist 
identity, in his particular case a jihadist identity. This identity was added into his 
prominence pyramid, but it was subordinate to his fierce Pashtun identity,186 family 
identity, and student identity. With time, however, the jihadist identity would grow in 
prominence.  
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b. Stage 2 
As his jihadi identity was formed, Shahzad developed the specific beliefs, norms 
and values which make up the identity standard for that specific identity. The current 
jihadi ideology is one that has evolved over the past 70 years, beginning in earnest with 
Sayyid Qutb.187 It has gone through several changes, but the ideology in general follows 
a fundamentalist approach, arguing that Islam has gone off the true path, it is in imminent 
danger—both by external forces, especially the west, and internal corruption—and only 
jihad can get it back on course. These activists aim to create religious states that uphold 
Sharia law and governance according to the Qur’an and the Sunna, the words and actions 
of the Prophet Mohammed.  
While jihadists argue amongst themselves on specific targets and the path to 
upholding the true tenets of Islam, the Al Qaeda global jihad narrative resonated 
specifically with Shahzad. Shahzad clearly articulated his discontent with the United 
States, Christians, Jews, democracy, and U.S. law throughout his video, providing 
specific justification of his views from the Qur’an and Hadith.188 At the time of his 
conviction, Shahzad warned the U.S. judge and court that the war between the United 
States and Muslims had just begun and Islam would not lose.189 Shahzad was also known 
to quote Ibn Taymiyyah and Abul Ala Mawdudi,190 both central figures in the jihadi 
ideological doctrine. He clearly identified the United States as the enemy, responsible for 
humiliating Muslims around the world. He further argued that violent jihad was the only 
way to fix the problem, echoing the ideology of Al Qaeda. 
In addition to the ideological component of his identity, Shahzad developed a mix 
of new ties at college, both among western Muslims and fellow Pakistani students, 
including particularly other jihadists. During this time, Shahzad became increasingly 
critical and hostile towards U.S. policy in the Middle East. In 2003, he was part of a 
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Google Groups email message that had pictures of detainees in the U.S. detention facility 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba with the “Shame on you Bush” written at the bottom.191 This 
particular issue was another factor in the process of his radicalization.  
Shahzad was further radicalized by Anwar Al Awlaki, a U.S. born Yemeni 
jihadist. Shahzad contacted both Al Awlaki and Baitullah Mehsud via the Internet. In his 
video, Shahzad specifically thanked the English-speaking clerics that spoke about jihad 
freely, saying “If it weren’t for you, I probably would not be here today.”192 This denotes 
the power of extremist ties, both physical and virtual. 
Shahzad identified with a number of grievances, including those that were 
personally relevant and those that had no personal resonance but associated with his 
jihadist identity. Due to his Pashtun heritage, personally relevant grievances included the 
United States’ involvement in Afghanistan, U. S. abuses of Muslim prisoners in Abu 
Ghraib, and the perceived humiliation of Muslims in Afghanistan and Pakistan.193 The 
2003 invasion of Iraq in particular greatly angered Shahzad. He believed that the United 
States deliberately invented the chemical weapons threat as an excuse to invade Muslim 
lands. Shahzad was extremely hostile toward the U.S. government for the drone strikes in 
Pakistan and Yemen. Shahzad also identified with a number of grievances that did not 
directly affect him, such as the Palestinian conflict, prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, and 
the suffering of Muslims from Tunisia to India.194 Finally, Shahzad was angry at the 
people around him for his lack of financial success. While Shahzad found steady 
employment and made between $50 thousand and $70 thousand per year, he was 
constantly angry that he was not being paid enough.195  
In July 2004, Shahzad purchased a home in Shelton, Connecticut in preparation 
for an arranged marriage. On December 25, 2004, Shahzad married Huma Mian in 
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Pakistan, and had a child shortly thereafter.196 The process of getting married and having 
a child appeared to slow the radicalization process somewhat, as the husband and father 
identities took prominence over the jihadist identity for a while. 
c. Stage 3 
In February 2006, Shahzad sent an email with the subject line “My Beloved and 
Peaceful Ummah.” This became the transition point from a latent extremist to an activist 
extremist. The email was critical of democracy and urged people to follow the teachings 
of the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet instead of conforming to man’s laws and 
norms. He also demonstrated a strict adherence to Islamic laws, praying five times a day, 
abstaining from alcohol, and attending several different mosques.197 These behavior 
changes suggest that his jihadi identity had gained prominence and that he began 
activating the jihadi identity amongst certain friends. He also began to distance himself 
from childhood friends in Pakistan and his father’s social circle. During this time period, 
acquaintances noted that he was irritated all of the time and complained about the cost of 
things in America.198  
In 2008, Shahzad travelled to Pakistan and asked for his father’s permission to 
fight in the jihad in Afghanistan against the United States, but his father refused his 
request. He also began to disagree greatly with his father over beliefs and practices. 
Begrudgingly, Shahzad returned to the United States and continued his life. The act of 
seeking permission from his father indicated that Shahzad held his father and his family’s 
support of his actions in high esteem, indicating that his his family identity was still more 
prominent than his jihadist identity.  
In 2009, Shahzad’s marriage became strained for a number of reasons but, most 
notably, because he demanded that his wife wear hijab. The request for his wife to wear 
hijab may only be a sign of increased religious piety; however, Shahzad became more 
pious beginning in 2006, and there is no evidence that during that three-year period he 
                                                 




requested his wife become more conservative. The co-occurrence of challenging his 
father’s authority and making more demands on his wife could indicate a change in 
prominence of the family and extremist identities. His wife left him in 2009 after he 
called from the airport demanding that they leave the United States immediately and 
return to Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, where his wife’s family lived. This separation of close 
martial ties, which would have otherwise inhibited his behavior, allowed Shahzad to 
travel to Pakistan and devote all of his time to his jihadist identity.  
Shahzad left for Pakistan in July of 2009 and found his way to a training camp run 
by TTP that taught him specific skills in making improvised explosives, conducting 
target reconnaissance and employing operational security measures.199 While at the 
training camp, Shahzad received five days of weapons training and five days of bomb 
making instructions.200 Since Shahzad had recently attained U.S. citizenship, he was an 
ideal candidate for a domestic attack. He also agreed to make a video explaining his 
beliefs, stating his intentions to conduct the attack, and to inspire others to conduct 
further attacks. His final video message to other jihadists watching stated, “Anything is 
possible, you can make an attack, you just have to try.”201 This video was the last act of 
the activist extremist trying to inspire other people to join the cause. Shahzad’s return to 
the United States represented his transition from an extremist activist to a violent 
extremist. 
d. Stage 4 
In February 2010, Shahzad returned from Pakistan for the last time and 
immediately began operational preparations. He paid cash for a small apartment, bought a 
Nissan Pathfinder off of Craigslist, and began to gather materials including fertilizer, 
propane, gasoline, fireworks, and other necessary materials for a VBIED.202 He accessed 
websites that stream video of Times Square to determine the best location and time to 
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conduct an attack.203 The video cameras also provided Shahzad with assurances that his 
attack would be recorded for his video that would be released after his attack. During the 
three months he spent preparing for the attack, Shahzad also met with two separate 
couriers to receive $12,000 for expenses related to the attack from TTP; this was in 
addition to $5,000 that he was given in Pakistan while attending the training camp.204 In 
March 2010, Shahzad bought a semi-automatic rifle to use in the event that he was 
captured before the bomb could be planted.205 
On May 1, 2010, Shahzad parked the Nissan Pathfinder in Times Square and left 
the vehicle filled with explosives, intending to kill and injure many people. Shahzad used 
a long fuse to allow for him to escape. He left the car and walked toward a subway 
station to take the train back to Connecticut; however the bomb never detonated. Shahzad 
said that when the first bomb failed he was going to build another and plan a separate 
attack, but the police began to close in and he tried to flee the country.206 He was arrested 
at JFK airport prior to his departure. Shahzad pled guilty to all charges and demonstrated 
no remorse during the sentencing hearing. He told the judge at the sentencing hearing to 
“Brace yourselves, because the war with Muslims has just begun. Consider me only a 
first droplet of the flood that will follow me.”207  
Shahzad’s progression through the radicalization process is marked by several key 
events. He had a personal crisis on 9/11, which marked the beginning of Stage One. He 
developed contact with extremists and began the indoctrination process, becoming a 
latent extremist in Stage Two. His identification with grievances in support of an 
extremist ideology led to activism in Stage Three. Finally, the separation of protective 
ties and the inability to reconcile the grievance through activism led him to transition to 
Stage Four and begin operational preparations for his attack.  
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The following extremist attributes are identified below in the medium to high 
range, using VERA.  
e. Attributes 
Stage: 1 
A.9  Identity problems 
A.7  Hate, frustration and persecution 
D.1  Sex Male= High 
D.2  Married <1year= High 
D. 3  Age <30= High 
 
Stage: 2 
A. I  Attachment to ideology justifying violence 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.6  Rejection of society and values IAlienation 
A.7  Hate frustration, persecution 
A.9  Identity problems 
C.3  Direct contact with violent extremists 
C.4  Anger at political decisions, actions of country 
P.5  Significant other/community support 
D.1  Sex Male= High 
D.2  Married <1year= High 
D. 3  Age <30= High 
 
Stage: 3 
A. I  Attachment to ideology justifying violence 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.4  Dehumanization of identified target 
A.5  Internalized martyrdom to die for cause 
A.6  Rejection of society and values /Alienation 
A.7  Hate frustration, persecution 
A.8  Need for group bonding and belonging 
A.9  Identity problems 
A.10  [Level of] Empathy for those outside own group 
C.l  User of extremist websites 
C.2  Peer/Community support for violent action (peer support observed) 
C.3  Direct contact with violent extremists 
C.4  Anger at political decisions, actions of country 
H.5  Travel for non-state sponsored training/ fighting 
H.6  Glorification of violent action 
D.1  Sex Male= High 
D.2  Married >1 year= Low 





A.I Attachment to ideology justifying violence 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.4  Dehumanization of identified target 
A.5  Internalized martyrdom to die for cause 
A.6  Rejection of society and values /Alienation 
A.7  Hate frustration, persecution 
A.10  Empathy for those outside own group 
C.l  User of extremist websites 
C.2  Peer/Community support for violent action (peer support observed) 
C.3  Direct contact with violent extremists 
C.4  Anger at political decisions, actions of country 
H.5  Travel for non-state sponsored training/ fighting 
H.6  Glorification of violent action 
D.1  Sex Male= High 
D. 3  Age >30= Low 
2. Case 2: Mohamud Osman Mohamud 
On November 26, 2010, a 19-year old naturalized Somali was arrested while 
attempting to detonate what he thought to be a VBIED at Portland, Oregon’s annual 
Christmas tree lighting ceremony. This attack would have resulted in numerous civilian 
casualties, including women and children. The individual in question was Mohamed 
Osman Mohamud, and he was a member of what he believed to be a three man Islamic 
extremist cell, which in reality consisted of himself and two FBI undercover employees 
(UCEs). 
Mohamud was born on August 11, 1991 in Mogadishu, Somalia, during a time of 
turbulent conflict in that country. Prior to Mohamud’s immigration to the United States, 
he and his family endured a long period of physical and emotional instability during a 
chaotic transition208 that manifested itself in, among other things, delaying his physical 
development.209 Upon his arrival in the United States and his family’s reunification, his 
parents set out to assimilate themselves and their family into American culture. However, 
the family experienced yet another traumatic event that deeply affected Mohamud when 
their residence burned down, nearly killing his whole family. Despite this, Mohamud did 
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well in school, made friends, and participated in sports.210 Then, in 2006, at the age of 
15, Mohamud began to recognize the diaspora nature of his ethnicity, culture, and 
religion211 and began to undergo what his father described during his court trial as an 
“identity crisis.”212 
a. Stage 1 
At this point, Mohamud entered Stage One of the radicalization process, which 
was caused by a crisis of identity. In that year, Mohamud’s family structure began to 
dissolve, which ultimately resulted in his parents getting divorced.213 The divorce and 
other family practices that he considered religiously lenient put Mohamud’s family and 
religious identities in a state of crisis, which likely caused those identities to fluctuate in 
prominence. His family’s instability prompted Mohamud to begin a search for contacts 
within religion that could provide him with stability in his crisis, thus making Mohamud 
vulnerable to extremist Islamic ideologies. 
b. Stage 2 
At some point between 2007 and 2008, Mohamud met an Islamic extremist 
named Amr Suleiman Ali Al-Ali, a Saudi national studying in the United States at North 
Seattle Community College and Portland State University.214 In 2010, after returning to 
Saudi Arabia, Al-Ali was arrested by Saudi authorities who named him as one of their 47 
most wanted terrorists.215 Prior to Al-Ali’s detention by Saudi authorities, it was 
Mohamud’s friendship with Al-Ali that was the critical tie that influenced Mohamud’s 
identity and direction into Islamic extremism, as well as marked his transition into Stage 
Two of the radicalization process as a latent extremist while he searched for stability of 
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identities. Al-Ali’s influence would continue to play a critical role through Stage Four of 
Mohamud’s radicalization. 
On February 8, 2009, Mohamud expanded his contact with extremists as he 
reached out and established email contact with Islamic extremist Samir Khan in response 
to Khan’s call for authors for Jihad Recollections. Initially, Mohamud agreed to write at 
least one article a month for the publication; however, the contact between the two 
increased between February and August of 2009, with the exchange of approximately 
150 emails focused on the development and propagation of material devoted to radical, 
violent Islamic jihad.216 Khan proclaimed himself “Al Qaeda to the core,” and like 
Mohamed was raised in the United States until 2009 when he left for Yemen to become a 
propagandist for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); his mission was to 
motivate Islamic inspired extremists in the West to conduct “lone wolf” attacks.217 
In trial testimony, Khan was identified as Mohamud’s mentor and further 
evidence was presented that showed Mohamud was influenced by several extremist 
clerics, including Anwar Al-Awlaki.218 This relationship affirms his Islamic extremist 
ideological indoctrination process from strong personal ties, as well as from weak and 
distant ties via the Internet as the communication medium. The following months were 
marked with Mohamud’s continued indoctrination, framing his grievance with the 
perception that Muslims were being unjustifiably killed and their lands occupied by 
western invaders.219 As the grievance formation developed, Mohamud began to transition 
into Stage Three as an activist extremist. 
c. Stage 3 
As an activist extremist, Mohamud submitted four articles between April and 
August of 2009, which were published under the pen names Ibnul Mubarak and Abu 
Talha. In his articles, he discussed how to physically and mentally prepare for violent 
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jihad. He also describe operational practices for ambushing American helicopters in 
Afghanistan and killing wounded soldiers; he offered analyses on both the role of al-
Qaeda’s information operations prior to 9/11,220 and on methods for jihadi groups to 
operate within Europe undetected.221 Mohamud’s commitment to writing for Jihad 
Recollections waned at this point, likely as a result of his desire to become operational as 
a violent extremist when he realized that activism could not provide a resolution 
mechanism for his grievance. 
On August 31, 2009, Al-Ali emailed Mohamud information about a Yemeni 
school to use as a cover and detailed instructions to facilitate his travel to Yemen.222 
Upon receiving the information, Mohamud approached his father, Osman, regarding his 
desire to travel to Yemen to study Islam at the Dar Al-Hadith School. Osman refused 
Mohamud’s request and confiscated his passport. Following his conversation with 
Mohamud, Osman contacted the FBI the same day to express his concerns about his son 
potentially being recruited by extremists. His father informed them that Mohamud was 
still a child, who was easily susceptible to influence and being brainwashed.223 
Mohamud’s Imam reiterated Osman’s concern during an interview with FBI agents later 
that year. He stated that Mohamud was looking for guidance and was easily susceptible 
to influence.224 It is at this point that Mohamud began to demonstrate a desire to be 
actively recruited into a violent extremist group. 
Having been denied travel to Yemen by his father, Mohamud enrolled as a 
freshman at Oregon State University in Corvallis, Oregon in the fall of 2009 with the aim 
of studying engineering. During his time in college, he engaged in sex, drugs, and alcohol 
use. He later described to the FBI UCEs, and recorded in his personal journal, that these 
activities were an effort to create a double life to prevent him from being identified as an 
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extremist.225 This could also potentially indicate that Mohamud was in a state of identity 
conflict due to the creation of newly formed weak ties that were pulling him away from 
Islamic extremism and back towards non-religious activities. Additionally, in November 
2009, he began to demonstrate violent tendencies when he was accused of raping a fellow 
female student. However, no evidence was uncovered to indicate that the incident was 
anything more than a consensual encounter; therefore, Mohamud was never charged with 
the rape. 
As a result of Mohamud’s extremist ties and behaviors, the FBI initiated email 
contact with Mohamud as part of their investigation on November 9, 2009. This contact 
was initially conducted through a FBI confidential source named “Bill Smith,” and from 
November 2009 to August 2010, he and Mohamud exchange 44 emails that consisted of 
propagating extremist ideologies, discussions on how to maintain operational security, 
and depictions about Mohamud’s desires to become operational in support of violent 
jihad overseas.226 As a tie that helped to facilitate the propagation of an extremist 
ideology, Smith is considered yet another of Mohamud’s many extremist contacts. 
In December 2009, the FBI electronically monitored communication between 
Mohamud and Al-Ali that originated out of the federally administered territory of 
northwest Pakistan, a location known to strongly support and train the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda.227 This communication consisted of Al-Ali’s recruitment of Mohamud to join 
him in violent jihad,228 to which Mohamud responded, “Just tell me what I need to 
do.”229 Al-Ali then put him in contact with Abdul Hadi, who would facilitate Mohamud’s 
travel to join Al-Ali.230 However, Mohamud was unable to contact Hadi.231 
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With a second failed attempt to leave the United States, Mohamud returned to 
activism by accessing and using extremist Islamic websites and social networking 
forums. According to Evan Kohlmann, a terrorism consultant and expert witness at 
Mohamud’s trial, these sites provided Mohamud the chance to “directly interact with 
radical religious figures, militant leaders, and like-minded recruits living in their own 
community.”232 Mohamud’s online postings included a hit list of individuals who had 
offended Allah and Mohamud’s encouragement to others to leave suspicious packages in 
urban areas to cause mass panic.233 These online activities enabled Mohamud to connect 
to other extremist and provide verification of his extremist identity through in-group 
versus out-group verification. 
d. Stage 4 
On June 14, 2010, Mohamud was prevented from boarding a flight to Kodiak, 
Alaska, as a result of being placed on a no-fly list, following Mohamud’s father’s contact 
with the FBI. In later discussion with the FBI’s UCEs, Mohamud disclosed that the 
purpose of the trip was to earn money to facilitate his travel to Yemen and that he felt 
betrayed by his parents reporting him to the FBI.234 During the trial, the prosecution 
argued that, at this point of the radicalization process, Mohamud had fully accepted an 
extremist belief system that violent action against U.S. civilians was justified to resolve 
his grievance.235 At his trial, evidence was also presented that Mohamud had admitted to 
feeling suicidal and that he lacked direction in his life during this time.236 In his own 
statements, Mohamud admitted that “the people he thought were al-Qaeda saved his life 
because ‘I finally felt like I belonged;’ ‘I felt like they cared for me;’ and ‘They gave me 
something to do.’”237 This is likely linked to multiple antecedent factors interacting in his 
life that caused him to feel isolated: the rape accusation, guilt from his secular life 
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conflicting with his Islamic identity, being a member of a diaspora community, the recent 
discovery that his parents had reported him to the FBI, the divorce of his parents, and 
others factors not detailed in court documents. Combined, these stressors resulted in the 
identity crisis that made Mohamud seek recruitment into violent extremism.238  
On June 23, 2010, the FBI UCE1, known as Youssef, emailed Mohamud, 
pretending to be an associate of Al-Ali’s, offering to help Mohamud as an Islamic 
brother.239 After Mohamud’s initial operational security concerns were alleviated,240 he 
considered the terrorist cell comprised of Youssef and UCE2, known as Hussein, as a 
means to execute a VBIED style attack on U.S. soil.241 This assumption was based on the 
technical knowledge he believed Hussein had about explosives,242 and that he himself 
lacked.243 Mohamud later explained that, in order to execute his proposed attack on 
Pioneer Square, he needed “the right people” to help him execute it, specifically Hussein 
to help him build a VBIED.244 He expressed that it was his desire to see the bodies of the 
enemies of God torn everywhere and that it was his intent for “whoever is attending that 
event to be, to leave either dead or injured,” including women and children.245 Not only 
did he intend to commit a mass atrocity, but he believed the deaths were justified.246  
This mindset indicates an extremist interpretation of Islam, which was a product 
of his personal and online ties with violent extremists and possibly nurtured further by the 
dialogue between Mohamud, Youssef and Hussein in the context of group polarization, 
with Hussein’s documented comments justifying violent extremism through his 
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statements quoting, “an eye for an eye.”247 When asked by Hussein what Mohamud 
would have done if he had never met Youssef or himself, Mohamud explained that he 
would have traveled to Saudi Arabia to get in touch with people that could facilitate his 
desire of violent extremism.248 These factors demonstrate a clear transition point for 
Mohamud into Stage Four, violent extremism, of the radicalization process; however, 
until this point, due to a lack of means, Mohamud was unable carry out his desire to 
conduct an attack on behalf of his violent extremist ideology. 
Between September and December 2010, further meetings between the three cell 
members consisted of planning,249 acquiring components necessary for the VBIED, 
reconnaissance of the target location at Pioneer Square,250 the detonation of a “test” 
bomb, and a post-attack propaganda video of Mohamud that articulated his grievance that 
condemned America, its military, their occupation of Muslim lands, and glorified 
Allah.251 
On November 26, 2010, the day of the planned attack, Mohamud’s actions 
demonstrated he had completed the transition to a violent extremist. While positioning 
the VBIED with Hussein, Mohamud expressed his pleasure with the bomb and 
reaffirmed his desire to carry out the attack. He then armed the device by attaching its 
blasting cap.252 After moving to a predetermined safe location, Mohamud attempted 
twice to initiate the device before he was arrested by the FBI. Immediately following his 
arrest, Mohamud began yelling “Allahu Akhbar” and violently kicking the law 
enforcement officers in the vehicle with him until he was restrained.253 
Mohamud’s progression through the radicalization process has several key 
turning points, including an identity crisis as a teenager in Stage One; contact with a 
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plethora of extremists and indoctrination as a latent extremist that continued from stages 
two through four; grievance framing in support of an extremist ideology and activism in 
support of it in Stage Three; and finally the inability to reconcile the grievance through 
activism, resulting in a transition to Stage Four with the assistance of facilitators that 
provided Mohamud with the technical means to execute an attack.  
e. Attributes 
The following extremist attributes are identified in the medium to high range in 
his radicalization using VERA. 
Stage: 1 
A.6  Rejection of society and values /Alienation 
A.8  Need for group bonding and belonging 
A.9  Identity problems 
H.1  Early exposure to violence in home 
D.1  Sex Male = High 
D.3  Age < 30 = High 
 
Stage: 2 
A.1  Attachment to ideology justifying violence 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.6  Rejection of society and values /Alienation 
A.7  Hate, frustration, persecution 
A.8  Need for group bonding and belonging 
A.9  Identity problems 
C.2  Peer/community support for violent action (peer support observed) 
C.3  Contact with violent extremists 
C.4  Anger at political/foreign policy actions of country 
H.1  Early exposure to violence in home 
D.1  Sex Male = High 
D.3  Age < 30 = High 
 
Stage: 3 
A.1  Attachment to ideology justifying violence 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.4  Dehumanization of identified target 
A.5  Internalized martyrdom to die for cause 
A.6  Rejection of society and values /Alienation 
A.7  Hate, frustration, persecution 
A.8  Need for group bonding and belonging 
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A.9  Identity problems 
A.10  [Level of] Empathy for those outside own group 
C.1  Participant/user of extremist websites 
C.2  Peer/Community support for violent action (peer support observed) 
C.3  Contact with violent extremists 
C.4  Anger at political/foreign policy actions of country 
H.1  Early exposure to violence in home 
H.6  Glorification of violent action 
D.1  Sex Male = High 
D.3  Age < 30 = High 
 
Stage: 4 
A.1  Attachment to ideology justifying violence 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.4  Dehumanization of identified target 
A.5  Internalized martyrdom to die for cause 
A.6  Rejection of society and values /Alienation 
A.7  Hate, frustration, persecution 
A.8  Need for group bonding and belonging 
A.9  Identity problems 
A.10  [Level of] Empathy for those outside own group 
C.2  Peer/community support for violent action (peer support observed) 
C.3  Contact with violent extremists 
C.4  Anger at political/foreign policy actions of country 
H.1  Early exposure to violence in home 
H.6  Glorification of violent action 
D.1 Sex Male = High 
D.3  Age < 30 = High 
B. ANALYSIS 
On the surface, these two cases demonstrate great variation, a Pakistani man 
living in Connecticut who immigrated to the United States for better education, and a 
Somali-American youth living in Washington State. Despite the differences in race, 
ethnicity, age, and socioeconomic origin, the two cases demonstrate fairly consistent 
trajectories. This finding echoes Silber and Bhatt’s finding that “[i]n spite of the 
differences in both circumstances and environment in each of the cases, there is a 
remarkable consistency in the behaviors and trajectory of each of the plots across all the 
stages.”254  
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This consistency provides the opportunity for intervention if appropriate risk 
factors can be identified and validated. If further evaluation proves the risk factors as 
accurate, it will provide communities, law enforcement, and government agencies with a 
framework from which to develop effective and proactive prevention, intervention, and 
interdiction strategies. This will help to focus CVE efforts and resources to mitigate the 
risk factors in each stage of the radicalization process to reduce the risk of violent 
extremism. 
Another key finding in both of these cases is the importance of interaction 
between individuals and identity transformation throughout the process. In both cases, the 
radicalization process is perpetuated by the addition of extremist ties and the separation 
of prosocial ties. For example, Shahzad’s marriage and the birth of his first child seem to 
have delayed the process of radicalization for a short time. If prosocial ties and positive 
influences on identity are a protective factor, then intervention programs for at risk 
individuals should stress the creation of such ties. If individuals do not have ties that 
promote normal values and beliefs, it will be difficult for the individual to change their 
beliefs. 
In addition to ties and identity, activism plays a significant role in both cases. 
Stage Three of the CITIG framework posits that individuals will engage in activism on 
behalf of grievances associated with the extremist identity. We posit that activism is 
necessary to verify the identity of the newly formed extremist identity. Activism provides 
a sense of meaning and belonging for the individual through identity verification that 
provides both cognitive and emotional reinforcement.255 Shahzad participated in email 
groups, sent email messages urging others to take action, professed his views to friends 
and family, and recorded the video with TTP to inspire others to conduct attacks. 
Mohamud wrote articles for publication in Jihad Recollections, participated in a number 
of online forums, and tried to leave the country on two separate occasions to engage in 
jihad. Extremist activism solidifies the identity, demonstrates commitment to other 
extremists, and begins to reduce the barriers for more criminal and violent behavior. 
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The cases also provide the basis to identify attributes by stage using VERA. In 
general, the cases support the instrument, but some items could be refined. The 
demographic factors (D.2, D.3) are challenged by Shahzad’s case in that he was married 
over one year when he conducted the attack and he was over 30. The cases also suggest 
that the contextual factor peer/community support for violent action (C.2) should be 
separated into two separate factors: one for peer and one for community. Furthermore, 
both cases demonstrate peer support for the extremists, but neither had community 
support for their action, indicating that these two factors are separate and distinct.  
Additionally, the contact with extremists factor (C.3) appears to be too broad. 
Both developed contact with extremists through both virtual and traditional means, but 
the types of extremist contacts could also be significant. Mohamud needed the support of 
someone with technical expertise in bomb-making since he could not travel to receive 
training, identifying that contact with particular skill sets should be explored. We use the 
term “facilitator” to identify particular contacts with technical expertise, as opposed to 
general support for the extremist identity. These items should be investigated in future 
research to determine if these cases highlight significant shortcomings, or if the variance 
is an artifact of the small sample. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we analyzed two Islamic-inspired cases of radicalization to violent 
extremism using the CITIG radicalization framework developed in Chapter III. These 
cases provided initial validation for the framework and identified attributes present 
during each stage of the process. The two cases provide greater insight into the 
complexity of the radicalization process and highlight the variation between cases. In 
order to broaden the sample of cases for the CITIG radicalization framework, Chapter V 
will analyze two more cases; a white supremacist and an eco-terrorist.  
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V. WHITE SUPREMACIST AND ECO-EXTREMIST CASE 
STUDIES 
Islamic-inspired extremism has captured the focus of media and policy makers 
over the last decade, but other forms of extremism exist and pose considerable threats to 
security. This chapter will expand its examination of case studies to non-Islamic forms of 
extremism by analyzing two cases of radicalization in the United States: Kevin William 
Harpham, a white supremacist; and Briana Waters, an eco-extremist. 
This chapter will use the CITIG framework created in Chapter III to analyze these 
cases. It also makes a distinction between violent and criminal extremists, noting that 
violent extremists focus on harming individuals or groups of people, whereas criminal 
extremists aim to destroy property. Finally, this chapter uses the VERA instrument to 
evaluate both cases. 
This chapter finds support for the CITIG framework, specifically in stages two 
through four. As posited in Stage Two of the framework, individuals either make contact 
with an extremist that leads to indoctrination, or begin indoctrination that results in the 
development of ties with extremists. Briana Waters made a tie that led to indoctrination, 
while Kevin Harpham began an indoctrination that resulted in ties with extremists. As 
noted in Chapter III, Stage Three includes a broad range of activism and reinforces the 
role that activism plays in identity verification. In Stage Four, Waters’ case supports the 
framework’s distinction for the criminal extremist category. In this instance the rejection 
of violence was the result of the moral directives of the eco ideology. Despite the 
different categories (criminal and violent extremist), the radicalization process was 
consistent. Finally, this chapter finds that VERA is not adequate in its current form for 
evaluating the criminal extremist case; therefore, the chapter concludes by recommending 
a new risk assessment instrument based on VERA that is specifically tailored for criminal 
extremists. 
This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section reviews the CITIG 
framework created in Chapter III. The second section presents the two case studies, a 
white supremacist and an eco-extremist. The third section provides analysis on the 
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similarities and differences of these two cases and the final section offers summary 
thoughts.  
A. RADICALIZATION FRAMEWORK 
As described in Chapter III, the CITIG framework proposed in this thesis consists 
of four stages. Stage One begins with a personal crisis that is exacerbated by antecedent 
conditions, such as a lack of strong social ties that typically provide an individual with 
support networks and grounding within their existing identity and social structure. In a 
search to resolve the crisis, an individual will make new ties or find new ideologies, 
which result in the formation of a new identity that will continue to evolve throughout the 
radicalization process. Stage Two consists of the reframing of the personal crisis that 
links the evolving identity to a grievance through indoctrination that may precede or 
follow contact with extremists. An individual will progress from Stage Two to Stage 
Three when they take actions to gain acceptance and approval (identity verification) of 
the extremist group. In Stage Three the individual begins to engage in activism on behalf 
of the perceived grievances of the new extremist identity. Stage Four occurs when there 
is a lack of a resolution mechanism for the grievance or crisis and the extremist begins 
operational planning to execute a specific action, criminal or violent, with which to force 
a resolution to their grievance. 
In addition to using the CITIG framework to analyze the cases, this chapter will 
also draw on VERA to identify specific attributes of the extremists. VERA is the first risk 
assessment instrument developed specifically for violent extremists and each of the 
various factors are scored on a low, medium, and high level. The items in the instrument 
will also serve as the basis for identifying specific attributes that appear at each stage of 
the radicalization process. This framework will be applied to analyze the cases of Kevin 
William Harpham and Briana Waters. 
1. Case 1: Kevin William Harpham: White Supremacist Case Study 
Kevin William Harpham pleaded guilty to planting a bomb at the Martin Luther 
King Jr. Unity Day Parade in Spokane, Washington, on January 17, 2011. Harpham built 
and deployed a pipe bomb filled with black powder and fishing weights coated in an 
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anticoagulant to create more casualties. However, law enforcement discovered the bomb 
prior to detonation; the parade was rerouted and the bomb safely disarmed.  
Through the police investigation and trial, the personal history and motives of 
Harpham were uncovered, as was his path to violent extremism. Harpham’s path to 
radicalization will be further analyzed below using the four stage CITIG framework 
proposed in Chapter III. 
a. Stage 1 
Kevin William Harpham was described as a generous man that always helped 
friends, beginning in high school and continuing up until the attack. In an effort to 
explore the world and save money for college, Harpham joined the military and served 
one four-year enlistment as a field artilleryman at Ft. Lewis, Washington.256 After 
leaving the military, he went to college in Spokane, Washington and earned a degree that 
allowed him to work as an electrician. While in Spokane, Harpham first formed his 
extremist identity. 
In a blog post dated October 25, 2007, on the Vanguard News Network (VNN), 
Harpham replied to a thread titled “when did you become racially aware,” and stated “… 
I went in the army in 96’ [sic] and learned that niggers were an entirely different critter 
than I had thought they were.”257 He claims he did not hold racist views at that point, 
saying “[i]t wasn’t till around 2002/2003 when I stumbled onto Stormfront and found a 
link to William Pierce’s broadcasts that I realized I was at war and didn’t even know it. 
The next year was the most educational time of my life.”258 Stormfront, an online chat 
board, was created in 1995 by Don Black and is one of the first successful white 
nationalist online forums.259 William Pierce was a central figure in the white supremacist 
movement who authored a number of works including the 1978 race war novel titled The 
Turner Diaries. The Turner Diaries is written as a series of diary entries from the 
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perspective of the character Earl Turner, who is part of an organization battling the 
United States. The book concludes when the white supremacist group defeats the 
government and exterminates all other races.260 Pierce also founded the National 
Alliance in 1974, a white nationalist organization, with the goal of spreading his ideology 
about race, religion, and the future of the United States. Pierce was a prolific writer, 
speaker, and advocate for the white supremacy movement. His papers, lectures, podcasts, 
and videos are still an inspirational force today. 
The Turner Diaries, along with the postings on Stormfront, became key 
documents that motivated Harpham and his path to radicalization. Harpham’s blog post 
indicates that he first formed his extremist identity in 2002, in response to a personal 
crisis based on his interaction with other races and lack of prosocial ties that would help 
alleviate the crisis. Harpham acknowledged that he first perceived a difference in races in 
the military. This perception likely continued while he was enrolled in college. In 
addition to his racial crisis, the lack of prosocial ties, which serve as a protective factor, 
created a personal crisis that began the radicalization process. His description of “the 
most educational time of my life”261 refers to his ideological indoctrination that occurs in 
Stage Two. 
b. Stage 2 
In 2004, Harpham finished his degree and moved from Spokane to East 
Wenatchee, Washington,262 where he joined the National Alliance in February of that 
year.263 William Pierce and the National Alliance organization became central to the 
modern white extremist movement and to Harpham. Pierce was a source of indoctrination 
for Harpham and the first extremist contact that Harpham made. The National Alliance 
did not maintain an exclusive residence or compound where members lived, so joining 
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the group meant little more than adding his name to a roster and receiving a membership 
card, but the membership served as a hub for further indoctrination and extremist ties. 
In November 2004, Harpham joined the VNN under the name “Joe Snuffy.” VNN 
was a message board that provides digital space for white supremacists to meet and 
interact. Harpham had a strong connection to Glenn Miller, who ran VNN at the time. 
Miller was the head of the White Patriot Party in the 1980s, in addition to being a former 
leader of the Carolina Knights of the KKK. He was also the editor of the newspaper The 
Aryan Alternative.264 
Both message boards, Stormfront and VNN, allowed Harpham to access material 
that further indoctrinated him into the ideology of the white supremacy movement. White 
supremacy is not confined to one organization or even one goal. Simi and Futrell, for 
example, argue that there are four distinct branches of the white supremacy movement: 
the Ku Klux Klan; Christian Identity and neo-Pagan racists; neo-Nazis; and racist 
skinheads.265 Generally, white supremacists believe that Aryans are the superior race, 
and that all other races, including Jews, homosexuals, and non-Aryans have polluted the 
world. Some groups, like Christian Identity, believe that Anglo-Saxons are the true 
Israelites and therefore they are the chosen people of God.266 Simi and Futrell further 
argue that “Aryans desire a racially exclusive world where non-whites and other sub-
humans are vanquished, segregated, or at least subordinated to Aryan authority.”267 Most 
Aryans believe that a racial holy war is necessary to purify the world of non-Aryan 
blood.268 
Harpham focused specifically on a violent version of Aryan ideology. In a post 
dated January 19, 2006, he argues that while black people and Jews are the problem, “… 
IMO [in my opinion] if whites are to get through this alive, Xtianity [Christianity] will 
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need a bullet.”269 This viewpoint was further elucidated by a posting that he was 
disappointed that the Turner Diaries did not contain bomb making instructions.270 
Harpham also used the phrase Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG), another term that is 
prevalent in the Turner Diaries. Harpham also drew inspiration from the video Loose 
Change, which argues that the attacks on 9/11 were a “false flag” operation, meaning that 
the United States perpetrated the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 
order to invade Iraq and Afghanistan.271 This narrative fits well into the white 
supremacist movement, which believes the Jews are secretly running the government in a 
conspiracy against everyone else. 
Harpham identified with the anti-government elements of the ideology, but he 
also had other grievances that propelled him through the radicalization process. He 
posted “I have a deep seeded resentment for just about anyone with money.”272 He 
further claimed that “[i]f things ever get real bad for me I will specifically target these 
people for the few hundred dollars in their wallet… The great thing about it is your [sic] 
doing something that benefits your race and your [sic] getting paid for it.”273 The white 
power movement does not discriminate against people with wealth, but Harpham 
includes this grievance into his larger extremist identity. 
c. Stage 3 
Harpham crossed from Stage Two to Stage Three in 2006. He began donating 
money to VNN, posting regularly to the VNN forum, and expanding his activism. 
Harpham began writing for a white nationalist newspaper, The Aryan Alternative, 
indicating his white supremacist identity was becoming more prominent. This level of 
activism rose from 2006 through 2009. 
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In an effort to expand his contact with extremists, Harpham expressed interest in 
joining the Aryan Nation in 2006; however, it is not known why he ultimately chose not 
to join. One possibility is that the Aryan Nation lost its compound at Hayden Lake, Idaho, 
as a result of a lawsuit brought by the Southern Poverty Law Center. Harpham had 
expressed interest in the compound in a 2006 posting to VNN and specifically praised the 
idea of a racially pure farming community, arguing that it could be done with start-up 
capital.274 Given his desire to live in a racially pure community, the loss of the Hayden 
Lake compound may have removed the incentive of joining the Aryan Nation. 
Nevertheless, his blog post stating the desire to move to an all-Aryan compound 
demonstrates the growing prominence of his extremist identity.  
In 2006, Harpham moved from East Wenatchee, Washington, to Addy, where he 
lived until the attempted bombing.275 While in Addy, Harpham designed and built a three 
story home by himself.276 The home sat on a ten acre plot of land that provided Harpham 
with the space to pursue his views without interference. His neighbor and tenant 
described Harpham as a very generous man during this time, checking on him daily, 
driving him to medical appointments in Spokane, and making repairs to his home.277 
In August 2006, Harpham posted, “I can’t wait till the day I snap. Videos like that 
bring me closer to it every time I watch them. Fear of death is the only thing stopping 
me…”278 The post was in response to a YouTube video that showed German police 
responding to an incident between anti-fascists and neo-Nazis. Harpham’s desire to act 
showed his commitment to activism and the strengthening of his extremist identity. 
Harpham also continued to strengthen his ties with other white supremacists and 
became well known in specific circles. Following an attack on a posting by “Joe Snuffy,” 
on VNN, Glenn Miller defended him saying, “Joe Snuffy is a generous contributor to 
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VNN and to our newspaper projects. He’s also a volunteer distributor.”279 In 2007, Glenn 
Miller acknowledged Harpham personally on VNN for his monetary contributions 
saying, “you rank among the top 5–6 VNN’ers in total amount of money contributed.”280 
The money paid for 7,000 copies of the 16-page newsletter the Aryan Alternative. 
Harpham also wrote for the newspaper during his activism stage. 
Despite being outspoken on chat boards and other social media forums for white 
supremacists, Harpham concealed his ideological convictions from those around him. 
Simi and Futrell argue that concealment is essential for the survival of the movement, and 
several leaders encourage adherents to hide their identity while in public.281 Harpham hid 
his extremist identity while working as an electrician, while associating with his 
neighbors, and when interacting with his family. His mother and aunt both wrote letters 
to the judge during the sentencing phase of the trial that indicated that he was a generous 
man, and therefore, could not have had a hand in the bombing. Simi and Futrell further 
contend that the white supremacist movement needs hidden spaces, both physical and 
virtual, for adherents to meet and reinforce their identity, which is an essential 
characteristic of activism.282 
Further postings reveal Harpham’s violent intentions within his Aryan identity. In 
2009, Harpham asked other VNN users for help finding the author of a World War II 
quote about winning a war through bombing.283 In 2010, Harpham also made a comment 
on VNN about the uselessness of the radioactive chemical thorium in building bombs. 
These comments suggest that Harpham was experimenting with bombs in preparation for 
his attack. The quote he referenced also shows that he believed his attack would help the 
Aryans win their perceived racial war. These comments effectively demonstrate his 
transition from an extremist activist to a violent extremist.  
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d. Stage 4 
Harpham spent approximately a year in the violent extremist stage prior to 
committing the attack. In 2010, Harpham began experimenting with building bombs. 
Following his failed attack, a number of books on how to build bombs were recovered as 
evidence from Harpham’s residence.284 The investigation also revealed that Harpham 
built a test bomb to ensure that his would explode during the attack. Following the 
instructions of one book, Harpham designed his bomb and added fishing weights for 
shrapnel, which he purchased from the Walmart in Colville, Washington, in October and 
November of 2010, months before the parade. He coated the weights in an anti-coagulant 
to increase the lethality of the bomb. Following the attempted attack, the FBI recovered a 
digital camera that contained images of Harpham at the parade, in addition to close up 
photos of both African American children and an older Jewish gentleman wearing a 
yarmulke.285 These images suggest that Harpham targeted a range of people, all of which 
were well in line with blog posts and the demonized out-groups of the white power 
ideology. 
Following the failed attack, the FBI and local law enforcement carefully 
dismantled the device leading to a wealth of physical evidence. They successfully traced 
the fishing weights used in the bomb to the Walmart in Colville, which led to the 
identification of Harpham as the suspect for the bombing. Due to the risk of arresting him 
in his home, SWAT officers created a construction zone ruse near Harpham’s house and 
arrested him without incident. In addition to books on bomb making, law enforcement 
found an assault rifle in the trunk of his vehicle. Harpham pled guilty to planting the 
device and was sentenced to 32 years in prison. 
Harpham began his radicalization process in 2002 as a result of the combination 
of exposure to different races and the absence of strong social ties. In 2003, Harpham 
became indoctrinated into the white power ideology and began developing contacts with 
extremists. Harpham became increasingly angry at the government, wealthy individuals, 
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and the concept of diversity which propelled him into Stage Three. Harpham began Stage 
Three in 2006 when he became an activist extremist as demonstrated by writing for white 
power literature, donating money to various organizations, and distributing material for 
the cause. In 2009, Harpham began to increase his skill in building bombs, including a 
successful operational test. This cemented his transition to a violent extremist. He 
remained in Stage Four until the attack on January 17, 2011. 
The following extremist attributes are identified below in the medium to high 
range, using VERA. 
e. Attributes 
Stage: 1 
A.7  Hate, frustration and persecution 
A.9  Identity problems 
H.4  State-sponsored military, paramilitary training 
D.1  Sex Male= High 
D.2  Married <1year= High 
D.3  Age <30= High 
 
Stage: 2 
A.1  Attachment to ideology justifying violence 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.4  Dehumanization of identified target 
A.6  Rejection of society and values/Alienation 
A.7  Hate frustration, persecution 
A.9  Identity problems 
A.10  [Level of] Empathy for those outside own group 
C.1  User of extremist websites 
C.3  Direct contact with violent extremists 
C.4  Anger at political decisions, actions of country 
H.4  State-sponsored military, paramilitary training 
D.1  Sex Male= High 
D.2  Married <1year= High 
D. 3  Age <30= High 
 
Stage: 3 
A.1  Attachment to ideology justifying violence 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.4  Dehumanization of identified target 
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A.6  Rejection of society and values /Alienation 
A.7  Hate frustration, persecution 
A.10  [Level of] Empathy for those outside own group 
C.1  User of extremist websites 
C.2  Peer/Community support for violent action (peer support observed) 
C.3  Direct contact with violent extremists 
C.4  Anger at political decisions, actions of country 
H.4  State-sponsored military, paramilitary training 
H.6  Glorification of violent action 
D.1  Sex Male= High 
D.2  Married <1year= High  
D.3  Age >30= Low 
 
Stage: 4 
A.1  Attachment to ideology justifying violence 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.4  Dehumanization of identified target 
A.6  Rejection of society and values/ Alienation 
A.7  Hate frustration, persecution 
A.10  Empathy for those outside own group 
C.1  User of extremist websites 
C.2  Peer/Community support for violent action (peer support observed) 
C.3  Direct contact with violent extremists 
C.4  Anger at political decisions, actions of country 
H.4  State-sponsored military, paramilitary training 
H.6  Glorification of violent action 
D.1  Sex Male= High 
D.2  Married <1year= High  
D.3  Age >30= Low 
2. Case 2: Briana Waters: Eco-Extremism Case Study 
Briana Waters became involved in the eco-extremist movement in the Pacific 
northwestern United States in 2001. Her involvement in the extremist movement 
culminated with two separate criminal attacks on property that consisted of firebombing 
both the Center for Urban Horticulture (CUH) at the University of Washington in Seattle 
and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Litchfield Wild Horse Corrals in Susanville, 
CA. Following the attacks, Waters disengaged from the extremist movement until her 
arrest by the FBI in 2006. 
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Waters grew up in Pennsylvania as the product of a split family, forcing her 
mother to raise her and her brother alone. She did not have a privileged childhood, but 
managed to perform well in school, impress her teachers, and received multiple awards 
for her achievements. Waters ultimately earned a scholarship and attended college at the 
University of Dayton in Ohio, until she transferred to Evergreen State College in 
Olympia, Washington, where she completed her education and graduated in 1999.286 
a. Stage 1 
In Stage One of Waters’ radicalization, her transfer across the country to 
Evergreen State likely resulted in the severing of both strong and weak ties that she had 
developed and maintained throughout her adolescence. The resulting isolation during her 
search for social ties at Evergreen State created the conditions for a crisis of identity that 
made her vulnerable to radicalization. Transitioning into this new social network required 
Waters to develop a new identity to fit in with the social context of the new ties she 
developed. This environment included a network inundated with eco-extremists, 
including her future boyfriend, Justin Solondz, an activist extremist within the 
environmental movement. As a result, this triggered a reordering of identities within her 
prominence hierarchy. Waters’ environmentalist identity then gained prominence while a 
reordering occurred to reconcile identity conflicts as her network of ties became denser 
with other eco extremists.  
b. Stage 2 
Marking Waters’ transition into a latent extremist at Stage Two of the 
radicalization process, Waters developed dense social ties with both latent and activist 
extremists in the environmental movement, including a romantic tie with Solondz. In 
Waters’ testimony, she admits she adopted many of the beliefs and ideologies in an effort 
to fit in with her peers. These beliefs included the right to damage property, but not harm 
humans.287 Her admission exhibits the strength and density of her ties within the eco 
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extremist movement and social isolation due to a lack of bridging ties into normal 
society. 
It was through these ties with various animal rights and environmental student 
groups that Waters was exposed to environmental indoctrination rooted in common 
beliefs, norms, and values derived from ecological theology. Ecological theology is 
comprised of two fundamental concepts: biocentrism and deep ecology. Biocentrism is 
described as the belief that all organisms are equal and deserve moral rights and 
considerations,288 while deep ecology requires the restoration of the earth to an imagined 
pristine state.289 It was these fundamental concepts that began to frame Waters’ 
environmental grievance associated with her eco identity and provided moral justification 
for her actions. 
Eco-extremism’s ideological indoctrination framed three moral standards that 
Waters eventually incorporated into her extremist identity in stages two through four of 
the radicalization process. The first standard established that inflicting economic damage 
on those profiting from the destruction and exploitation of the environment was 
acceptable; the second advocated educating the public on the atrocities committed against 
the earth and all species that populate it; and the third urged taking precautions against 
harming any animal, human, and nonhuman in efforts to protect the environment.290 
These moral standards led Waters to believe that the capitalist system was a fundamental 
threat and must be destroyed; that publicity was the oxygen of the movement for 
education and recruitment; and that the goal of operations was property and economic 
damage through arson and vandalism, not violence towards living beings. 
c. Stage 3 
Waters’ transition into an activist extremist, which is Stage Three of the 
radicalization process, was marked by her participation in peaceful, non-violent, protests 
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in an attempt to find a political resolution for her environmental grievances. Waters’ 
activism reached its zenith in 1999 when she helped develop an alliance between 
environmental activists and the community of Randle, Washington. She documented this 
effort in a film that she directed and produced called Watch.291 During this time her eco 
identity was highly salient as a result of the combination of strong and weak social ties 
within both the environmental movement and the Randle community. This level of 
commitment demonstrates that the environmental movement had become extremely 
important to her, resulting in her eco identity becoming the master identity. 
During this stage of her activism, Waters’ environmental grievance metastasized 
with the realization that, despite activists’ efforts, her desired deep ecology end-state to 
preserve the environment could not be achieved through activism alone. This realization 
occurred after the timber companies in Randle harvested 100 acres of 400-year old trees 
at Fossil Creek and sold the clear cut land, providing the timber company with additional 
funds to purchase more forests to harvest. As portrayed toward the end of her 
documentary, Waters’ experience in Randle resulted in the realization that activist 
extremism could not stop capitalism, thus more extreme behavior would be necessary.292 
d. Stage 4 
During this time Justin Solondz, her boyfriend of over a year, met William 
Rodgers and became active in a criminal extremist cell called “Forest Defense,” which 
used arson and other criminal acts against perceived enemies of the environment.293 
Rodgers had been involved for years in underground ELF/ALF actions, including a series 
of arsons, as well as publishing “how to” manuals for sabotage and arson. This contact 
with Rodgers, along with a lack of any personal conflict resolution mechanism, provided 
Waters’ boyfriend, Solondz, with the means to transition to Stage Four, criminal 
extremism. On July 31, 2000, Solondz participated in an ELF/ALF action that destroyed 
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five acres of canola crops in Washington state,294 and on March 18, 2001, he girdled 
approximately 800 hybrid poplar trees at three separate Oregon State University research 
locations, effectively killing them and the research they supported.295 
It is the ties between Waters and Rodgers through Solondz296 that ultimately put 
the three individuals in contact each other.297 The combination of Waters’ unresolvable 
grievances and the newly developed tie with Rodgers provided her access to ways and 
means with which to take action. She accepted Rodgers’ recruitment offer into the Forest 
Defense cell in April 2001. 
Initially Rodgers only used Waters to assist with small tasks, such as acquiring 
cell phones for him in her name.298 Waters performed other support roles, including 
arranging transportation needs299 and providing her residence as a safe location to 
manufacture incendiary devices used to set fires.300 However, on May 21, 2001, Waters 
operationally solidified her position in Stage Four of the radicalization process as a 
criminal extremist when she and other members of the cell set fire to the CUH at the 
University of Washington.301 During the CUH firebombing operation, Waters served as a 
lookout to warn the team of any passing law enforcement patrols.302 
Waters experienced a moral crisis from the extent of the destruction in the CUH 
operation. However, the pull of her strong ties influenced Waters to participate in a 
second criminal act. On October 15, 2001, the cell firebombed the BLM Litchfield Wild 
Horse and Burro Corrals in Susanville, California, because she and other cell members 
objected to the treatment and slaughter of wild horses.303 This became the last operation 
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conducted by Rodgers’ cell and it broke up shortly after the attack.304 Ultimately, it is 
difficult to identify what eventually caused Waters to disengage from her criminal 
extremist behavior, her moral crisis, the dissolution of the cell, or the loss of a romantic 
tie. 
After 2001, Waters did not have any further known criminal involvement, which 
may have been the result of several factors.305 The first factor may have been that the 
breakup of Rodgers’ cell deprived Waters of her means to remain an operational criminal 
extremist. A second possible reason for her retreat from criminal activism was a betrayal 
by Solondz. Allegedly, Solondz and Phillabaum, another member of Rodgers’ cell, had 
an affair and Waters severed her romantic tie with Solondz.306 A third reason, argued by 
Neil Fox, Waters’ attorney in the sentencing memorandum, was Waters’ realization that 
her actions were a “...combination of youthful enthusiasm and desire to gain the approval 
of others who [sic] she respected and who she thought were seeking to improve the 
world.”307 
Whatever the reason for Waters’ disengagement, she chose to sever ties with her 
dense network of environmentalists and started a new life in San Francisco, California, 
where she worked as a nanny, music teacher, and musician who regularly performed at 
charitable events within the community. During that time, Waters went through another 
identity transformation when she became involved in a relationship with John Landgraf. 
The two had a child together in February 2005 and lived together as a family until 
Water’s arrest in February 2006.308 
Between 2006 and 2012, Waters was the defendant in two criminal trials for her 
involvement in the CUH and BLM arsons. In the first trial, in 2008, Waters pled not 
guilty to her role in the attacks; however, she was found guilty on two counts of arson 
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and sentenced to six years in prison on June 19, 2008, of which she served 28 months.309 
In September 2010, Waters’ conviction was overturned due to a series of errors and she 
was released. In 2012, Waters was again charged for her role in the two arsons, but this 
time on charges of conspiracy, possession of an unregistered firearm, arson and using a 
destructive device during a crime of violence. Contrary to the first trial, Waters entered a 
plea agreement and chose to tell the truth about her role in the attacks and provide 
testimony against Solondz for a reduced sentence,310 so she could better care for her 
daughter, now that her “…main interest is to be a loving parent to her daughter, K.L., and 
to raise her in a way so that K.L. will not repeat her mother’s errors.”311 
The change from Waters’ initial plea of not guilty in 2008 to accepting a plea 
bargain in 2012 offers some important clues for the process of disengagement and de-
radicalization. As previously identified, in 2001 Waters disengaged from criminal 
extremism and transitioned to a latent extremist. However, her disengagement did not 
translate into ideational de-radicalization, which requires a process of reordering of 
identities within her prominence pyramid. In 2008, Waters’ extremist identity likely still 
maintained a dominant position within her prominence pyramid as demonstrated by being 
the only member of the cell not to plead guilty. After being found guilty and spending 28 
months apart from Landgraf and her daughter, a reordering of her identities likely 
occurred. In her 2012 sentencing memorandum, attorney Neil Fox argued that “Now, at 
36 years of age, an established violin teacher, and the parent of a seven-year-old 
daughter, Ms. Waters looks back at her life in 2001 with shame. Ms. Waters’ main 
interest is to be a loving parent to her daughter, K.L., and to raise her in a way so that 
K.L. will not repeat her mother’s errors.”312 The attorney’s claims suggests that her 
identity as a nurturing mother rose in importance over any previously related 
environmentalist identity as a result of the strong tie she had with her daughter. 
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Furthermore, Waters renounced her extremist ideology and acknowledged that she had 
been motivated by peer pressure, misguided idealism, and a desire to seek approval.313 
Waters’ case study of extremism shows a clear progression through both 
ideational and behavioral continuums of radicalization, disengagement, and subsequent 
de-radicalization through a process of identity formation, shedding, reordering of 
precedence, and access of salient identities due to both strong and weak social ties within 
her evolving social network. During this process the following extremist attributes were 
identified in her radicalization, as well as protective attributes in her disengagement and 
subsequent de-radicalization using VERA. VERA is designed specifically for violent 
extremism,314 and therefore, a number of factors deal directly with violence (factors A.1, 
C.2, C.3, H.2, H.6, and P.2). Of note, in Waters’ case, the VERA factors dealing with 
violence need to be modified to account for criminal action or support; otherwise 
criminal extremists would score deceptively low on VERA. This issue will be discussed 
in further detail in the analysis section of this chapter. 
e. Attributes 
Stage: 1 
A.8  Need for group bonding and belonging 
A.9  Identity problems 
D.1  Sex Female = Low 
D.3  Age > 30 = Low 
 
Stage: 2 
A.1  Attachment to ideology justifying (crime)/violence 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.6  Rejection of society and values /Alienation 
A.7  Hate, frustration, persecution 
A.8  Need for group bonding and belonging 
A.9  Identity problems 
C.2  Peer/community support for (criminal)/violent action 
C.3  Contact with (criminal)/violent extremists 
C.4  Anger at political/foreign policy actions of country 
D.1  Sex Female = Low 
                                                 
313 U.S. v. Briana Waters, 549, 1, 1.  
314 Pressman, Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism. 
 97 




A.1  Attachment to ideology justifying (crime)/violence 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.4  Dehumanization of identified target 
A.6  Rejection of society and values /Alienation 
A.7  Hate, frustration, persecution 
A.8  Need for group bonding and belonging 
A.9  Identity problems 
A.10  [Level of] Empathy for those outside own group 
C.1  Participant/user of extremist websites 
C.2  Peer/community support for (criminal)/violent action 
C.3  Contact with (criminal)/violent extremists 
C.4  Anger at political/foreign policy actions of country 
H.6  Glorification of (criminal)/violent action 
D.1  Sex Female = Low 
D.3  Age > 30 = Low 
 
Stage: 4 
A.1  Attachment to ideology justifying (crime)/violence 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.4  Dehumanization of identified target 
A.6  Rejection of society and values /Alienation 
A.7  Hate, frustration, persecution 
A.8  Need for group bonding and belonging 
A.9  Identity problems 
A.10  [Level of] Empathy for those outside own group 
C.2  Peer/community support for (criminal)/violent action 
C.3  Contact with (criminal)/violent extremists 
C.4  Anger at political/foreign policy actions of country 
H.6  Glorification of (criminal)/violent action 
D.1  Sex Female = Low 
D.3  Age > 30 = Low 
 
Disengagement 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
A.3  Identification of target of injustice 
A.4  Dehumanization of identified target 
A.6  Rejection of society and values /Alienation 
A.7  Hate, frustration, persecution 
A.9  Identity problems 
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A.10  Empathy for those outside own group 
C.4  Anger at political/foreign policy actions of country 
P.1  Shift in ideology 
P.2  Rejection of violence to obtain goals 
P.5  Significant other/peer support 
D.1  Sex Female = Low 
D.3  Age > 30 = Low 
 
De-radicalization 
A.2  Perception of injustice and grievances 
P.1  Shift in ideology 
P.2  Rejection of (crime)/violence to obtain goals 
P.5  Significant other/peer support 
D.1  Sex Female = Low 
D.3  Age > 30 = Low 
B. ANALYSIS 
Consistent with the two Islamic-inspired cases, the cases discussed in this chapter 
follow remarkably similar patterns. Harpham found an ideology that led to contact with 
extremists and Waters found contacts that led her to the ideology. Both individuals 
became more committed to their extremist identities over time as a result of their 
extremist activism. Activism served to cement the grievances of the extremist identity 
and provided meaning for the individuals. Consistent with the CITIG framework, each 
case took a different path into Stage Two, but both individuals progressed in a similar 
fashion through the rest of framework. In Stage Four, Briana Waters, in support of her 
grievances, conducted a criminal act that was designed not to harm humans, a 
contingency consistent with the moral directives of the eco movement’s ideology. 
Conversely, Kevin Harpham deliberately intended to harm people, specifically non-
Aryans, with the use of bodily violence. Taken together, these cases demonstrate that the 
process of radicalization, while similar, can produce different outputs: the criminal or the 
violent extremist. 
Waters’ case is also interesting because it involved a romantic tie that served as 
catalytic factor. McCauley and Moskalenko argue that, “Trust may determine the 
network within which radicals and terrorists recruit, but love often determines who will 
join. The pull of romantic and comradely love can be as strong as politics in moving 
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individuals into an underground group.”315 As posited by McCauley and Moskalenko and 
supported in Waters’ case, her romantic tie to Solondz most likely pulled her into the eco 
extremist movement.  
Another important element from the case studies is Briana Waters’ disengagement 
from criminal activity. After conducting two separate criminal extremist actions, she 
disengaged from the eco-terrorist cell. Following her relocation to San Francisco, 
California, she met John Landgraf and started a family. During this time she abstained 
from both criminal and activist extremism. Just as radicalization takes time to reorder 
identities, we posit that de-radicalization will also require time to reduce the extremist 
identity. Future research should explore this phenomenon in more detail, since it has the 
potential to inform intervention programs. The creation of a prosocial identity that 
provides meaning and belonging for the individual may be a means to de-radicalization. 
A third finding from the case studies is the apparent contradiction of the generous 
nature of Harpham toward his neighbors, family, and friends and his white supremacist 
ideology. The radicalization CITIG framework proposed in Chapter III acknowledges 
that each individual has multiple identities and that identities only affect behavior when 
activated.316 Harpham’s case appears to support this idea. Harpham was extremely 
generous toward his neighbor, an elderly man, including taking him to doctor’s visits, 
shopping for groceries on a weekly basis and making repairs to his house. Even while in 
jail, Harpham asked about the health and well-being of his neighbor. This kindness exists 
in stark contrast to the individual who posted over 1,000 messages on a white 
supremacist network spouting hate and intolerance. The complexity of identities is one 
reason that identifying who is at-risk for conducting a violent extremist attack is so 
difficult. Similar to the path to de-radicalization, future research should explore this 
phenomenon in more detail. 
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C. ASSESSING VERA  
As with the Islamic case studies, VERA demonstrates good construct validity for 
both of the cases in general. In an effort to improve the instrument, several issues arise 
with these two cases. Three major threads of divergence emerge from the case studies: 
the difference between criminal and violent extremism, the unitary nature of contact with 
extremists, and the addition of contextual factors to the romantic tie identifying it as a 
protective or catalytic factor. 
As mentioned, VERA is designed specifically for violent extremism317 and 
therefore a number of factors deal directly with violence (factors A.1, C.2, C.3, H.2, H.6, 
and P.2). The focus on violence is appropriate, and the violent extremist cases 
demonstrate support for this, but a criminal extremist would score deceptively low 
because of this focus. Factor P.2 rejection of violence to obtain goals should be present in 
all criminal extremists, but does not offer a protective element against criminal action. 
VERA still demonstrates relatively good validity for the case study of Briana Waters, 
when modified to include criminal acts. We recommend a second instrument be devoted 
specifically to criminal extremists using the same factors in VERA as a base. 
The second major theme of divergence is the representation of contact with 
extremists in a unitary nature. As the cases demonstrate, individuals with newly formed 
extremist identities are more likely to interact with latent extremists and activist 
extremists than violent extremists. Operational security is likely the reason for this, but 
the level of risk should increase as contact occurs with extremists who are criminally or 
violently operational. In order to account for this variance, the contextual factors should 
be expanded to address the diversity in contact with extremists. In order to expand this 
category and capture a more precise view of risk, specific definitions that cover the range 
of extremist behavior, like those proposed in Chapter II of this thesis, are required. 
Without relevant labels, it is impossible to accurately capture the variance in risk. 
The third major thread of divergence is the protective value of VERA’s factor 
D.2, the length of time married. VERA scores an individual as high risk if they are 
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unmarried, or if they are married/ cohabitating for less than one year. The risk level 
lowers if the individual is married or cohabitating for more than one year. VERA was 
developed by examining factors in the HCR-20 risk instrument and the SAVRY risk 
assessment instrument.318 Both of these instruments contain a factor that identifies 
marital ties as a protective factor. However, Briana Waters’ romantic tie acted as a 
catalyst for radicalization into criminal extremism rather than functioning as a protective 
factor. This case study raises questions as to the validity of the factor in its current form 
in predicting risk. Future research should address this factor; specifically, under what 
conditions does a romantic or marital tie provide a catalytic influence in the process, and 
under what conditions does it act as a protective value against radicalization.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the CITIG framework for radicalization was used to examine two 
cases: a white supremacist who was a violent extremist, and an eco-extremist who was a 
criminal extremist. These cases provide examples of extremist behavior beyond Islamic-
inspired extremism and help to identify whether various forms of extremism are unique 
or share common elements. While each form of extremism has unique characteristics, the 
cases demonstrate remarkable consistency across the various forms of extremism. 
In the next chapter, we will review the findings of the case studies, refine the 
CITIG framework from Chapter III, and propose strategies to address extremism in 
American communities. 
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VI. REVISED CITIG FRAMEWORK AND STRATEGIES 
This thesis began by providing a base of clearly defined terms relating to CVE, 
and using these definitions to create the four stage CITIG radicalization framework: 
personal crisis, new identity, activism, and criminal or violent attack. We then used this 
framework along with the VERA instrument to analyze four case studies of extremism in 
the United States: The first two case studies, which were based on Islamic inspired 
extremism, included Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to bomb Times Square in New York 
City in 2010, and Mohamud Osman Mohamud, who attempted to bomb the 2010 
Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon. The second set of two case studies 
analyzed Kevin Harpham, a white supremacist who attempted to bomb a parade in 
Spokane, Washington in 2011, and Briana Waters, an eco-extremist involved in two 
separate fire bomb attacks. 
Overall, this thesis has found that the CITIG radicalization framework is useful 
for analyzing the process of radicalization across ideological lines. The findings further 
provide evidence for the use of the VERA instrument, with suggested modifications for 
assessing cases other than Islamic extremism. In addition to these findings, this thesis 
concludes by proposing a population centric approach to countering violent extremism 
along three mutually supporting lines of operation: prevention, intervention, and 
interdiction. 
A. REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF CASE STUDIES 
Building upon the existing radicalization frameworks described in Chapter III, 
this thesis created the following CITIG framework: Stage One begins with a personal 
crisis that is exacerbated by antecedent conditions, such as a lack of strong social ties that 
typically provide an individual with support networks and grounding within their existing 
identity and social structure. In searching to resolve the crisis, an individual will make 
new ties or find new ideologies, which will result in the formation of a new identity that 
will continue to evolve throughout the radicalization process. Stage Two consists of the 
reframing of the personal crisis that links the evolving identity to a grievance through 
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indoctrination that may proceed, or follow, contact with extremists. An individual will 
progress from Stage Two to Stage Three when they take actions to gain acceptance and 
approval (identity verification) of the extremist group. In Stage Three the individual 
begins activism on behalf of the perceived grievances of the new extremist identity. Stage 
Four occurs when there is a lack of a resolution mechanism for the grievance, or crisis, 
and the extremist begins operational planning to execute a specific action, criminal or 
violent, with which to force a resolution to his or her grievance. Figure 9 provides a 
visual representation of this process. 
 
Figure 9.  CITIG Radicalization Framework 
Despite the diversity of demographic factors and ideological beliefs within the 
four cases studied, the framework demonstrates a consistent longitudinal radicalization 
process in each case based on identity prominence, contact with extremists, 
indoctrination, and grievances. Each case began at Stage One of the radicalization 
processes with a personal crisis, which initiated the reordering of identities within each 
individual. Mohamud’s crisis was the result of a dissolving family structure, a sense of 
alienation, and a series of exposures to violence and loss during adolescence. Waters’ 
crisis occurred as the result of a simultaneous loss of both strong and weak ties and a 
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search for acceptance. Shahzad’s crisis was 9/11 and the resulting U.S. military action, 
which he perceived as a threat to him as both a Muslim and a Pashtun. Harpham’s 
personal crisis was the result of a culture shock associated with joining the United States 
military that exposed him to races other than his own. 
In Stage Two, the individuals became more vulnerable to the influence of 
extremist ties and indoctrination as they sought to resolve their crisis. These ties and 
processes framed the personal crisis, including any grievances associated with the 
extremist ideology. For example, in Waters’ case, this process occurred with the creation 
of ties with eco-extremists and eco indoctrination at Evergreen State University. It was 
during this process that she internalized the grievances associated with deep ecology and 
biocentrism. 
Following the framing of the grievances, the case studies revealed that the 
individuals all verified their extremist identity through some form of activism during 
Stage Three. For example, Shahzad, Mohamud, and Harpham all demonstrated their 
activism through online activities that perpetuated extremist ideas through blogging or 
writing for extremist publications. Waters, on the other hand, produced a documentary of 
the environmental protest in Randle, Washington. 
The catalyst for the transition between Stage Three and Four in all four cases was 
the realization that activism was unable to resolve their grievance. This resulted in the 
individuals initiating either criminal or violent action in an effort to force a resolution of 
their grievance. For example, Waters demonstrated this realization at the end of her 
documentary, Watch, with a discussion on how political activism ultimately failed to 
protect old growth forests. Mohamud and Shahzad had similar grievances associated with 
a perceived threat against Islam from the perceived occupation of Muslim lands; they 
realized they could not change U.S. foreign policy through activism alone. These 
realizations, combined with the loss of prosocial ties throughout the radicalization 
process, became their catalyst into Stage Four.  
Through the application of the CITIG framework, it became clear there were 
numerous antecedent conditions that led to each individual’s identity crisis; however, the 
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common antecedent condition in every case was the lack of connecting strong prosocial 
ties for the individual in his or her time of crisis. As a member of a diaspora community, 
Mohamud lacked ties with those with similar ethnic, cultural, and religious identities, 
resulting in a sense of isolation. Waters crossed the country to attend college, which 
resulted in the loss of both strong and weak ties developed throughout adolescence. In 
each case, lack of prosocial ties magnified these personal antecedent conditions. As a 
result, it can be difficult to identify at risk persons in Stage One of the radicalization 
process. 
The case studies further revealed that there are two separate paths to Stage Two: a 
path through contact with extremists and subsequent indoctrination through newly 
established ties; or a path through initial self-indoctrination that results in contact with 
extremists. No matter the method, once in Stage Two, the results appeared the same: the 
individual framed a grievance, or grievances, and linked it to the indoctrinated extremist 
ideology. It is in this stage that the ideologies created the moral foundation for behavioral 
justifications in stages three and four. Finally, the ideology’s moral directives were 
essential to guide the individual’s actions, including violence and even sacrificing of 
one’s own life for the cause. 
Within the case studies, the effects of ideology’s moral directives are most 
pronounced in the eco-extremist movement. This is most likely due to the influence of 
their belief in deep ecology and biocentrism, which restrict what is deemed as acceptable 
behavioral action. The effects of these beliefs are demonstrated by the efforts of the eco-
extremist cell, Forest Defense, to avoid harming or killing humans or animals, solely 
targeting property in their attacks. 
Furthermore, through framing of the out-group, the extremist ideology affects 
target selection. For example, white supremacist Harpham selected the Martin Luther 
King Unity Day parade because of the diversity and concentration of non-whites 
attending the event, while Waters’ eco-extremist cell selected targets associated with 
capitalism that threatened the environment. Despite these findings, it is important to note 
that moral directives are not static and will change over time. 
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A third critical factor in the radicalization process was the influence of romantic 
ties. In eco-extremist Waters’ case, the relationship with Solondz functioned as a catalyst 
in stages two through four. Waters’ relationship with Solondz pulled her into the 
extremist movement through exposure to an eco-extremist ideology, which reinforced her 
use of activism in support of an eco-extremist grievance and tied the pair to Rodgers who 
served as a facilitator. Conversely, after her disengagement from the extremist cell, 
Waters’ romantic ties with Landgraf and their daughter resulted in a strong protective 
factor that most likely assisted in her de-radicalization. In Shahzad’s case, the romantic 
tie with his wife served as a protective factor that delayed his progression through Stage 
Two, constrained his behavior in Stage Three, and served as an impediment to his 
transition into Stage Four. Future research should address this factor; specifically, under 
what conditions does a romantic or marital tie provide a catalytic influence in the process, 
and under what conditions does it act as a protective value against radicalization. 
In Stage Three of the CITIG framework, all four cases demonstrated the role 
activism plays in verifying the newly formed extremist identity. As described in Chapter 
III, activism provides a sense of meaning for the individual through identity verification 
and provides a mechanism to address the grievances. For example, Shahzad sent email 
messages urging others to take action, professed his views to friends and family, and 
recorded the video with TTP to inspire others to conduct attacks. Mohamud, the other 
Islamic extremist studied, wrote articles for publication in Jihad Recollections, 
participated in a number of online forums, and tried to leave the country on two separate 
occasions to engage in jihad. Harpham, the white supremacist, began donating money to 
Vanguard News Network and posting regularly on their blog, writing for The Aryan 
Alternative, and attempted to join an Aryan Nation compound. Eco-extremist Waters 
participated in grassroots organizing and demonstrations that included civil disobedience, 
as well as directed and produced an environmental activism documentary called Watch. 
In each case, extremist activism served to solidify each individual’s identity through a 
demonstration of commitment to other extremists and began to reduce the barriers for 
more criminal and violent behavior. 
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A second factor that is tied to Stage Three, and is necessary to transition to Stage 
Four, is the perceived lack of a conflict resolution mechanism. In every case, each 
individual developed a perception that their activism was unable to bring a resolution to 
their perceived grievances. Once each individual reached this conclusion, he or she began 
planning for specific action. Mohamud and Shahazad realized that they could not end 
their perceived occupation of Muslim lands and the deaths of their Muslim brothers. 
Waters could not stop further destruction of the environment. Harpham came to believe 
that a race war was necessary to eliminate or subjugate minority races. 
In order to execute their action, each extremist required some specific form of 
technical capability, which took time to acquire. This capability was acquired either 
through personal experience or a tie with a facilitator. For example, Shahzad traveled to 
Pakistan to receive training from the Tehrik-e-Taliban. Mohamud acquired what he 
believed was a VBIED through his contact with Hussein. Waters’ tie with Rodgers 
provided her with training in tradecraft and access to fire bombs. And Harpham learned 
how to build bombs from reading a variety of books and building test bombs prior to his 
attack. Based on the case studies, the acquisition of technical knowledge appears to be a 
critical component that affects the level of sophistication of the action in Stage Four. As 
demonstrated in Waters’ case, small cells can maximize each individual’s abilities for a 
higher level of sophistication in their actions.  
Finally, in this thesis we posited that identity and social ties play critical roles in 
the radicalization process. An ideologically diverse set of cases confirmed that identity 
and social ties are critical factors throughout the entire radicalization process. We find 
that they are also essential to setting the conditions for disengagement and subsequent de-
radicalization. In addition to the factors of identity and ties, we identified catalytic risk 
factors, such as grievances, travel abroad for training, and isolation from prosocial 
influences. The only protective factors identified were the birth of a child and romantic 
ties. 
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B. ASSESSING VERA 
This thesis specifically recommends four areas of change to VERA based on 
findings from the case studies: the difference between criminal and violent extremism, 
the unitary nature of contact with extremists, the disaggregation and broadening of peer 
and community support, and the addition of contextual factors to any romantic tie 
identifying it as a protective or catalytic factor. 
Due to the variance between criminal and violent behaviors, a criminal extremist 
risk assessment instrument is necessary to properly identify relevant attributes associated 
with the behaviors of criminal extremists. In order to create a criminal extremist risk 
assessment tool, several factors in VERA focusing directly on violence need to be 
modified (factors A.1 attachment to ideology justifying violence, C.2 peer/community 
support for violent action, C.3 direct contact with violent extremists, H.2 family/friends 
involvement in violent action, H.6 glorification of violent action, and P.2 rejection of 
violence to obtain goals). Each of these factors specifically focuses on violence and, as a 
result, does not properly assess an individual who believes in an extremist ideology that 
rejects violence, such as the eco extremist movement that morally rejects violence based 
on biocentrism and deep ecology. Despite the specific focus on violence, when these 
factors were modified to account for the acceptance of criminal behavior, they 
demonstrated good validity. Therefore, the modifications of these factors provides 
appropriate contextual factors to ensure that criminal extremists are properly assessed. 
A second area of change recommended within VERA is the necessity for a factor 
that assesses the variance in contact with extremists. As identified in the case studies, 
each individual developed ties with a number of extremists during their radicalization 
process, which varied from latent to violent. In the case studies, ties with facilitators 
demonstrated a special factor of risk because the acquisition of technical knowledge 
appears to be the critical component that determined how quickly an individual 
transitioned from activism to operational capability. In order to account for this variance, 
the contextual factors should be expanded to address the diversity of contact with 
extremists, specifically contact with a facilitator. In order to expand this category and 
capture a more precise view of risks, specific definitions that cover the range of extremist 
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behavior, like those proposed in Chapter II, are required. Without relevant labels, it is 
impossible to accurately capture the variance in risk. 
A third recommended change to VERA is the disaggregation of peer and 
community support for criminal or violent acts (C.2). This factor addresses the risk 
associated with external support for the individual’s beliefs and actions. The case studies 
demonstrate peer support for both extremist beliefs and actions. However, none of the 
cases indicated any community support for either extremist beliefs or actions. Based on 
this finding, the peer and community elements should be separated into two separate risk 
factors in order to accurately capture the true risk level. 
The final recommended modification of VERA concerns the demographic factor 
D.2, length of time married. VERA scores an individual as high risk if they are unmarried 
or married/ cohabitating for less than one year. The risk level lowers if the individual is 
married or cohabitating for more than one year. This factor was developed for VERA 
based on factors in the HCR-20 risk instrument, which assesses the risk of general 
violence, and the SAVRY risk assessment instrument, which assesses risk of violence 
among youth.319 Both of these instruments contain a factor that identifies marital ties as a 
protective factor. However, the case studies challenge this factor. Future research should 
address under what conditions a romantic or marital tie provides a catalytic influence in 
the process, and under what conditions it acts as a protective value against radicalization. 
1. Revised CITIG Framework 
With these observations in mind, the thesis concludes with a revised CITIG 
framework for assessing the radicalization process. 
a. Stage 1 
Stage One begins with a personal crisis that is exacerbated by antecedent 
conditions, such as a lack of strong social ties that typically provide an individual with 
support networks and grounding within their existing identity and social structure. The 
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result of the crisis is the search for a resolution to the crisis which can lead to the 
formation of an extremist identity. 
In Stage One, individuals demonstrate relatively few distinctive attributes. All of 
the individuals in this study exhibited identity problems (factor A.9) and presented a 
variety of other factors such as rejection of society and values /alienation (A.6), hate, 
frustration, persecution (A.7), need for group bonding and belonging (A.8), early 
exposure to violence in home (H.1), and military, paramilitary training at home (H.4). 
b. Stage 2 
In a search to resolve the crisis, an individual will make new ties or find a new 
ideology, which will result in the formation of a new identity that will continue to evolve 
throughout the radicalization process. Stage Two also consists of the reframing of the 
personal crisis that links the evolving identity to a grievance through indoctrination that 
may proceed, or follow, contact with extremists. In an effort to gain acceptance and 
approval (identity verification) in the new identity, individuals will begin activism. 
Consistent with the CITIG framework, individuals demonstrated an attachment to 
ideology justifying violence (A.1) that included identification of the target of injustice 
(A.3) and dehumanization of the identified target (A.4). In addition to the ideological 
factors, individuals exhibit contact with violent extremists (C.3), participant/user of 
extremist websites (C.1), and peer/community support for violent action (C.2). The 
perception of injustice and grievances (A.2) is also present and accompanied by hate, 
frustration, persecution (A.7); rejection of society and values /alienation (A.6); anger at 
political/foreign policy actions of country (C.4); and low levels of empathy for those 
outside own group (A.10). The need for group bonding and belonging (A.8) and identity 
problems (A.9) were still present. In addition, a number of historical and protective 
factors were present including early exposure to violence in home (H.1); military, 
paramilitary training at home (H.4); rejection of violence to obtain goals (P.2); and 
significant other/peer support (P.5). 
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c. Stage 3 
In Stage Three, the individual begins activism on behalf of the perceived 
grievances associated with the new extremist identity. Activism serves three functions: 
cementing the extremist identity, providing a sense of meaning and belonging for the 
individual in the extremist community, and providing a mechanism to address grievances. 
The activism that is characteristic of Stage Three leads to further contact with 
extremists (C.3), anger at political/foreign policy actions of a country (C.4), and 
glorification of violent action (H.6). Activism can be in the physical world, like travel 
abroad for non-state sponsored training/fighting (H.5), or in the virtual world as a 
participant/user of extremist websites (C.1). As the extremist identity strengthens and 
indoctrination continues, individuals demonstrate a dehumanization of an identified target 
(A.4), and in some cases, internalized martyrdom to die for the cause (A.5). Factors that 
were present in Stage One and Two were still present in Stage Three.  
d. Stage 4 
Through repeated identity verification and the development of extremist ties, the 
extremist identity will rise to the master identity position late in Stage Three or at the 
beginning of Stage Four, suggesting the extremist identity will have the strongest effect 
on behavior. Progression to Stage Four occurs when there is a lack of a resolution 
mechanism for the grievance, or crisis, and the individual believes that criminal or violent 
action will be beneficial. The extremist begins operational planning to execute a specific 
action, criminal or violent, which he or she perceives will force a grievance resolution. 
Operational preparation may involve training and specialized skills from a facilitator, and 
the time required in training or acquisition of these skills accounts for the variance in the 
timing or sophistication of the action taken. 
The attributes associated with Stage Four are very similar to Stage Three with 
changes in intensity. In some cases the individual will express an internalized martyrdom 
to die for a cause (A.5) that was not present in Stage Three, or travel abroad for non-state 
sponsored training/fighting (H.5). The perception of injustice and grievances (A.2) and 
dehumanization of identified target (A.4) intensify from the medium to high category. In 
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addition to these changes, some individuals will exhibit decreased identity problems 
(A.9) due the verification of the extremist identity. These factors are summarized by 
stage in Figure 10. Figure 10 visually demonstrates the increasing risk that an individual 
will pose as they pass through the radicalization process. For the full VERA coding form, 
see the appendix. 
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P.2 Rejection of violence to 
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VERA factors identified by stage of the radicalization process
 
Figure 10.  VERA Factors Identified by Stage of the Radicalization Process 
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2. Prevention, Intervention, and Interdiction 
In addition to identifying attributes that are present at each stage and the role they 
play in the radicalization process, the attributes provide insight into countering 
radicalization. Figure 11 depicts the CITIG framework with the addition of the proposed 
pillars of prevention, intervention, and interdiction. Each of these pillars is discussed in 
detail with a review of the prominent strategies that are present in the United States.  
 
Figure 11.  Counter Radicalization Efforts within The CITIG Framework 
3. Applying the Model to Interdiction in the United States 
Domestically, the United States has a robust state and federal infrastructure for 
interdiction efforts. However, due to the nature of prevention and intervention strategies, 
which require frequent personal interaction with a combination of strong and weak ties, 
the focus must go beyond a whole-of-government approach and become a comprehensive 
whole-of-community effort. 
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Due to the difficulty of identifying individuals within Stage One and early Stage 
Two, a strategy of prevention should be applied that focuses on increasing the resiliency 
of communities. This pillar needs to focus on creating cross-cutting ties between racial, 
ethnic, and religious groups to build strong networks through diverse sets of prosocial 
individual and community ties. As argued by the Los Angeles Interagency Coordination 
Group (LA ICG), this strategy is accomplished through “consistent engagement and a 
comprehensive network of partners (public, private, and community),”320 which is the 
foundation of their CVE strategy. 
Both public and private organizations are necessary to create and build ties 
between communities. Within Los Angeles, the Human Resources Commission (HRC), a 
local government agency, has the mandate to develop cross-cutting ties designed to 
reduce discrimination, increase cultural competency and promote inter-group relations.321 
This agency functions as the focal point for creating inter-community ties, as well as ties 
between communities and the local government. These ties provide local communities 
and the government with the necessary connections and neutral environment needed to 
begin to understand and address grievances, as well as provide mechanisms for conflict 
resolution. The role fulfilled by the HRC is particularly important within population 
centers that have diverse beliefs and group identities.  
In Los Angeles, a private organization, the Muslim Public Affairs Council 
(MPAC), has taken a leading role in developing an initiative, called the Safe Spaces 
Initiative (SSI), for maintaining healthy Muslim communities. As a bridge between the 
LA ICG’s prevention and intervention pillars, the SSI argues for a model of prevention, 
intervention, and ejection (PIE). The prevention pillar focuses on mechanisms that allow 
for grievances to be addressed through healthy alternatives to a path of violence.322 The 
intervention pillar is comprised of both proactive and reactive measures uniquely tailored 
                                                 
320 Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group, The Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent 
Extremism (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group, 2015), 4. 
321 Joumana Silyan-Saba, “Government Community Engagement Methods: City of Los Angeles Case 
Study,” accessed May, 5, 2015, http://www.ejournalncrp.org/government-community-engagement-
methods-city-of-los-angeles-case-study/. 
322 Alejandro J. Beutel, “Safe Spaces Initiative,” Muslim Public Affairs Council, 2014, 20. 
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for each radicalizing individual, in order to trigger their disengagement and de-
radicalization.323 Within the SSI, the ejection pillar is considered a last resort and only 
used when the individual becomes a safety concern for the community and congregation, 
at which point it is necessary to involve law enforcement.324 The strength of this 
initiative is that it can be used as a blueprint for other religions and ideologies to address 
a broad range of extremism. Like the HRC, this framework focuses on increasing the 
resiliency of communities; however, since it is implemented within private institutions, it 
is able to comprehensively incorporate both prevention and intervention efforts in the 
same framework. The PIE model is depicted in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.  Safe Spaces Initiative PIE Model325 
Similar to the intervention focus of the SSI, Montgomery County Maryland has 
developed a community based voluntary intervention program called Crossroads. This 
county and federally funded program uses a holistic approach to mitigate and counter 
radicalization risk factors.326 It accomplishes this through individually tailored treatment 
plans designed to reduce ideological, psychological, economic, and sociological 
motivating factors,327 such as those identified with VERA, that lead to radicalization. The 
                                                 
323 Beutel, “Safe Spaces Initiative,” 56. 
324 Beutel, “Safe Spaces Initiative,” 86. 
325 Ibid., 18. 





strength of the crossroads program is its formalized access to resources and intervention 
teams to identify, assess, and address risk factors. 
Combined, SSI and the crossroads program provide a comprehensive public and 
private whole-of-community approach to both prevention and intervention. The strengths 
of these programs complement each other. SSI provides communities with internal 
methods to increase resilience by building capacity through awareness and education. 
What SSI lacks is a comprehensive source of resources for their leaders to easily access 
during an intervention that consists of disengagement and de-radicalization. This is where 
the Crossroads program would be able to support intervention efforts, like SSI, by 
providing a centralized location to access resources that streamline the intervention 
process. Both programs seek to educate and build awareness, but the fact that SSI is 
implemented within a community without ties to government funding increases the 
perceived legitimacy among vulnerable individuals and the community. 
Within the CVE strategy, the role of law enforcement is typically framed within 
the pillar of interdiction. This effort consists of the investigation, arrest, and prosecution 
of individuals who are intent on committing violence or crime associated with 
extremism.328 Domestic law enforcement operates in an extremely efficient manner 
within this pillar, while taking measures to uphold civil rights and civil liberties. 
However, the role of law enforcement bridges all three CVE pillars in support of a whole-
of-government effort. Within Los Angeles, the whole-of-government effort has begun to 
formalize itself as the ICG. The LA ICG is designed to extend interagency ties, as well as 
increase collaboration with community and government stakeholders.329 The 
institutionalization of designated roles and functions within the LA ICG will continue to 
improve the effectiveness of the ad hoc organization and increase its resiliency from the 
disruptive loss of key personalities over time. 
As a broad strategy, law enforcement agencies across the country have begun to 
leverage community-oriented policing in an effort to build ties and trust within vulnerable 
                                                 
328 Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group, The Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent 
Extremism (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group, 2015), 8. 
329 Ibid., 2. 
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communities in order to support the communities’ prevention and intervention efforts. 
Community-oriented policing should emphasize the separation of community outreach 
from investigative activities in order to build and maintain trust with the community. 
C. CVE STRATEGY 
1. Prevention 
As discussed in this thesis, prevention requires both a public and private effort. 
HRC fills the role of building inter-community ties, while the Safe Spaces Initiative 
provides an example of a private organization that increases the resiliency of the 
community through intra community ties. The partnership of public and private 
organizations leverages the strengths of each and mitigates the weaknesses. Together 
these two elements should address local factors that include grievances, the extremist 
ideologies, the acceptance of violence, awareness of the problem, and the development of 
both prosocial and cross-cutting ties to build socially cohesive communities that provide 
the framework to support those who experience crisis. 
The private/public partnership provides an interface for academia to conduct 
further research on the risk factors associated with Stage One and Two of the 
radicalization process. This will allow for the refinement of both the risk factors and roles 
of the private/public partnership. 
2. Intervention 
By its nature, intervention should focus on the individuals who have demonstrated 
risk factors associated with Stage Two and Three of the radicalization process. 
Intervention can still occur in Stage Four but the goal of intervention programs is to 
identify individuals who have not fully formed their extremist identity. Once the 
extremist identity becomes the master identity, and the individual discards ties with 
people associated with non-extremist identities, the task of de-radicalization becomes 
more difficult. Due to the relatively consistent attributes associated with Stage Two and 
Three, intervention efforts can be applied to a broad range of factors that mutually 
support each other. The combination of SSI and the Crossroads program provide the 
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blueprint to efficiently execute intervention through individually tailored treatment 
packages to ensure individuals remain disengaged and promote de-radicalization. 
Intervention efforts should build prosocial ties with non-extremist individuals and groups, 
address the personal crisis that began the process through means that may include 
psychological counseling, counter the extremist ideology, identify positive outlets for 
social change, develop the belief that crime and violence do not solve problems, and 
work to sever extremist ties.  
The relationship between LAPD, HRC, and SSI, provides an example of a 
mutually beneficial relationship that enhances law enforcement’s ability to protect the 
public, the communities’ ability to address internal concerns, and the ability to build 
cross-community ties. With the addition of the LA ICG, the goal of a whole-of-
government and whole-of-community approach can be achieved. The LA ICG provides 
the interface for the resources associated with the various government agencies that is so 
critical for at-risk individuals, including Department of Health, Department of Education, 
Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice. Trust and credibility are 
the glue that hold this delicate relationship together and allows it to function. Each party 
must recognize the role that trust plays in the relationship and work to build trust and 
institutionalize the ties between organizations.  
3. Interdiction 
The interdiction effort is an important aspect of CVE, but the larger discussion of 
interdiction is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, we have two specific 
recommendations. The first recommendation is to separate intelligence collection efforts 
from community engagement associated with prevention and intervention efforts in order 
to maintain trust with communities. Second, all reasonable efforts should be made to 
divert individuals into intervention programs rather than confinement with no specialized 




This thesis has aimed to contribute to the understanding of the radicalization 
process and extremism. In doing so, we presented a base of clearly defined terms and a 
radicalization framework based upon the interaction of identity, contact with extremists, 
ideological indoctrination, and framed grievance. From the application of an 
ideologically diverse set of case studies, we found evidence to support the longitudinal 
radicalization process. Using the VERA instrument, we further identified that the stages 
of the CITIG framework contain specific risk factors for which we propose a strategy of 
prevention, intervention, and interdiction based on Los Angeles Interagency Coordination 
Group’s CVE framework with community support. 
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APPENDIX. VERA CODING RESPONSE FORM 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM RISK ASSESSMENT 
Subject:  D. O. B.: Date :  
Administrator: Signature:  
Item I.D. Items Low Medium High 
A. ATTITUDE ITEMS    
A.1 Attachment to ideology justifying violence    
A.2 Perception of injustice and grievances    
A.3 Identification of target of injustice    
A.4 Dehumanization of identified target    
A.5 Internalized martyrdom to die for cause    
A.6 Rejection of society and values IAlienation    
A.7 Hate frustration, persecution    
A.8 Need for group bonding and belonging    
A.9 Identity problems    
A.10 Empathy for those outside own group    
TOTAL ATTITUDE FACTORS    
c. CONTEXTUAL ITEMS    
C.l User of extremist websites    
C.2 Community support for violent action    
C.3 Direct contact with violent extremists    
C.4 Anger at political decisions, actions of country    
TOTAL CONTEXTUAL FACTORS    
H. HISTORICAL ITEMS    
H.l Early exposure to violence in home    
H.2 Family/friends involvement in violent action    
H.3 Prior criminal violence    
H.4 State-sponsored military, paramilitary training    
H.5 Travel for non-state sponsored training/ fighting    
H.6 Glorification of violent action    
TOTAL HISTORICAL FACTORS    
P. PROTECTIVE ITEMS    
P.1 Shift in ideology    
P.2 Rejection of violence to obtain goals    
P.3 Change of vision of enemy    
P.4 Constructive political involvement    
P.5 Significant other/community support    
TOTAL PROTECTIVE FACTORS    
D. DEMOGRAPHIC ITEMS    
D.1 Sex (Male = High Female = Low)    
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VIOLENT EXTREMISM RISK ASSESSMENT 
Subject:  D. O. B.: Date :  
Administrator: Signature:  
Item I.D. Items Low Medium High 
D.2 Married (< 1 year = High ; ≥ 1 year = Low)    
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